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This thesis investigates the metaphysical nature of necessity. My study focuses 
primarily on the reduction of metaphysical necessity and the question of whether a 
necessary truth can be reductively defined. Theodore Sider (2011) develops a new 
reductive account of metaphysical necessity. Unfortunately, the multiple realizability 
problem posed by Jonathan Schaffer (2013) undermines the credibility of Sider’s 
account. This underlies my motivation to search for a revised Siderian account of 
necessity. On this basis, I propose a modified version of Sider’s account and argue that 
analytic, natural-kind and micro-reduction truths are necessary truths if and only if they 
express the same states of affairs as logical truths. Since logical truths are necessary 
truths, analytic, natural-kind and micro-reduction truths are necessary truths as well. 
In this thesis, I will proceed as follows. Chapter 1 introduces Sider’s account of 
necessity. In particular, I focus on his analysis of the necessity of a micro-reduction 
truth. His analysis is largely constitutive of the notion of a metaphysical semantics and 
some associated notions. I reconstruct his analysis and articulate his metaphysical 
semantics and the associated notions. Chapter 2 presents and clarifies the multiple 
realizability problem of Schaffer. His critique shows that Sider’s metaphysical 
semantics cannot handle multiple realizability. Sider (2013e) refutes this claim by 
arguing that the multiple realizability problem is a problem for his analysis of the 
necessity of a micro-reduction truth, not for his metaphysical semantics itself. This is a 
good starting point to propound a modified account of necessity. Chapter 3 proposes 
and articulates my modified analysis of the necessity of a micro-reduction, where I 
show that the necessity of a micro-reduction truth can be reductively defined without 
appeal to Sider’s metaphysical semantics. I argue that analytic, natural-kind and micro-
reduction truths are necessary truths if and only if they express the same states of affairs 
as logical truths. Logical truths are necessary and so are they. After that, I consider a 
potential objection to my modified account and attempt to respond to it. 
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I. An Overview of Modality 
Consider the following sentences: ‘All vixens are female’ and ‘All emeralds are green’. 
It is obvious that there are a number of similarities between both sentences. They both 
describe things in certain ways. They both are of a simple subject-predicate form. They 
both are true sentences. And so forth. However, they are different in terms of the modes 
or ways of truth: necessary and contingent truth. It is necessarily true that all vixens 
are female. It is necessarily true because it could not have been false that all vixens are 
female. It is impossible that there is a male vixen. To say that a vixen is male is like to 
say that a square is round. This is itself contradictory. By contrast, even though it is 
true that all emeralds are green, the truth is merely contingent. It is contingently true 
because it could have been false that all emeralds are green. It is possible that there is 
a red, purple or white emerald. It is necessarily true that all vixens are female whereas 
it is contingently true that all emeralds are green. The negation of ‘All vixens are 
female’ is impossible whereas the negation of ‘All emeralds are green’ is possible. This 
is how philosophers distinguish necessary truths from contingent truths in general. 
 Consider another pair of sentences: ‘Socrates is a human’ and ‘Socrates is a 
philosopher’. Some philosophers claim that Socrates is essentially human. In other 
words, the property of being a human is an essential (or necessary) property of 
Socrates. In general, a property P of an object O is essential iff O could not have failed 
to have P. Socrates is essentially human because he could not have failed to have the 
property of being a human. But although Socrates has a property of being a philosopher, 
he has this property only accidentally (or contingently). For he could have been a poet 
and written lyric poetry rather than asking questions about moral knowledge. As 
opposed to an essential property, a property P of an object O is accidental iff O could 
have failed to have P. It is accidently true that Socrates is a philosopher because the 
property of being a philosopher is an accidental property of Socrates. Intuitively, we 
might be inclined to think that Socrates would still be Socrates if he could have failed 
to have the property of being a philosopher, but Socrates would not be Socrates if he 
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could have failed to have the property of being a human.1 This is how philosophers 
distinguish essential properties from accidental properties in general. 
 The above considerations manifest the de dicto and de re distinction of modality. 
This is a generally accepted but still controversial distinction. Roughly speaking, a 
modal sentence is de dicto when it attributes its modal feature to a whole sentence, 
while a modal sentence is de re when it attributes its modal feature to a particular 
object. The contrast can be brought out by the following: 
 
(De dicto) Necessarily, the number of the planets is greater than 7. 
(De re) The number of the planets is such that it is necessarily greater than 7. 
 
The first sentence is de dicto since it attributes necessity to the whole sentence—‘the 
number of the planets is greater than seven’. Although the de dicto sentence is true, it 
is not necessarily true since clearly there might have been 6 planets or even less. The 
second sentence is de re because it attributes necessity to the object—the number that 
actually numbers the planets—8. The de re sentence is necessarily true since the 
number 8 is essentially greater then 7. 
 There are different strengths of necessity. In general, metaphysicians identify 
three kinds of necessity. Metaphysical necessity, the subject to explore in this thesis, 
is the most general kind of necessity. Logical necessity is a subset of metaphysical 
necessity. All logical necessities are metaphysical necessities but not all metaphysical 
necessities are logical necessities. For example, the sentence ‘Mark Twain is Samuel 
Clemens’ is considered as a metaphysically but not logically necessary truth. Physical 
necessity is a necessary truth given by the laws of nature. If the laws of nature are 
metaphysically necessary, then truths of physical necessity are true in all possible 
situations; but if they are contingent, truths of physical necessity are true in merely 
some possible situations where the laws of nature apply. In this thesis, my primary 
concern is the metaphysical kind of necessity. 
 There are also different strengths of possibility. There are at least two kinds of 
possibility in general: physical and metaphysical possibility. Physical possibility is a 
                                               
1 For an introduction of Essentialism, see Robertson & Atkins (2013), Cameron (2010), Roca-Royes 
(2011a), Roca-Royes (2011b). 
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narrow sort of possibility and the boundary of it is given by the laws of nature. The 
laws of nature tell us that it is physically impossible for one to travel faster than the 
speed of light. But if one believes that the laws of nature are merely contingent, then 
one would think possibility in a broader sense. According to metaphysical possibility, 
it is metaphysically possible for one to travel faster than the speed of light. It is also 
metaphysically possible that human beings are immortal. And so forth. The boundary 
of metaphysical possibility is very broad, though it is unclear and debatable how broad 
it is. For example, it is unclear to many philosophers whether metaphysical possibility 
allows the existence of impossibilities, such as a male vixen, a round square, etc.  
 Let us briefly talk about the philosophical importance of modality. Modality is 
indispensable in philosophical theorizing for many reasons. First, modal notions are 
everywhere in philosophy. The notions of disposition, counterfactuals and 
supervenience are often considered as modal notions. Philosophers provide analyses 
of these notions in terms of modality. Second, the development of modal logic in the 
middle of the 20th century has given philosophers reasons to scrutinize the 
metaphysical nature of necessity and possibility. At the core of the semantics of modal 
logic is a talk of possible worlds. The notion of possible worlds has been widely 
dominant in contemporary philosophy and has been continually calling out for 
explanation. Third, according to the traditional conception of philosophy, the goals of 
philosophical inquiries differ somewhat from those of empirical inquiries. Empirical 
science is a study of contingent reality of the world, whereas philosophy makes claims 
about what is necessarily true. For example, statements of fundamental metaphysics 
are claims of this sort. They are necessarily true if true and necessarily false if false. 
Last but not least, the radical revival of rethinking about modality derives largely from 
Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity (1972). The revolutionary contributions of his 
lectures compel contemporary philosophers to reconsider the relation between 
epistemic and metaphysical modality. His and Hilary Putnam’s (1975) convincing 
examples of the necessary a posteriori radically undermine the identification of a 
prioricity with necessity. Quine’s (1951) “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is another 
famous critique of analyticity that undermines the identification of analyticity with 
necessity. Putting all together, the reasons we considered suggest that the philosophical 
importance of modality is far-reaching and wide-ranging. 
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 So far, I have introduced some basis ideas of the notion of modality. I hope that 
the preceding paragraphs have helped readers grasp the notion of modality. 
 
II. My Plan of this Thesis 
Moving on: This thesis explores the reduction of metaphysical necessity. The central 
questions of this thesis are constitutive of the following. What is a necessary truth? 
How a necessary truth can be reductively defined? To explore these two questions, 
here is my plan.  
 In chapter 1, I examine Sider’s reductive account of metaphysical necessity. In 
particular, I focus on his analysis of the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. Let ‘C0’ 
be a complex predicate which describes the actual microphysical states of New York 
City in every detail. Given this setting, the sentence ‘Every C0 is a city’ is a necessary 
truth. Sider offers a reductive analysis to explain such a necessity. According to his 
analysis, the sentence ‘Every C0 is a city’ is a necessary truth if and only if it is a logical 
consequence of a micro-reduction truth. What then is a micro-reduction truth? To 
answer, he then defines the notion of a micro-reduction truth in a complicated way. 
His definition is largely constitutive of the notion of a metaphysical semantics and 
some associated notions. I reconstruct his whole analysis and give a review of the 
notion of a metaphysical semantics, the notion of ‘application axiom’ and the notion 
of ‘corresponding to’. I finish chapter 1 by showing how the sentence ‘Every C0 is a 
city’ is logically derived from his definition of a micro-reduction truth. 
 In chapter 2, I present and clarify the multiple realizability problem of Schaffer. 
In brief, he argues that Sider’s metaphysical semantics cannot handle multiply 
realizable truths. Since Sider’s analysis of the necessity of a micro-reduction truth is 
mostly constitutive of his metaphysical semantics, something has gone wrong in either 
one (or both) if Schaffer’s critique is successful. But Sider (2013e) argues that the 
multiple realizability problem is a problem for his analysis of the necessity of a micro-
reduction truth, not for his metaphysical semantics itself. This unresolved problem 
leaves room for improvement in Sider’s analysis. 
 In chapter 3, I develop a modified version of Sider’s account of necessity. Given 
the multiple realizability problem, I show that the necessity of a micro-reduction truth 
can be reductively defined without appeal to Sider’s metaphysical semantics. I argue 
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that analytic, natural-kind and micro-reduction truths are necessary if and only if they 
express the same states of affairs as logical truths. Logical truths are necessary and so 
are they. I understand the notion of ‘express’ as a semantic relation between sentences 
and states of affairs, and define ‘express’ in terms of the notion of a correct 
interpretation of David Lewis’s (1984) reference magnetism. My use of the term ‘state 
of affairs’ is simple. A state of affairs is a way things are or a way things are not.2 After 
that, I consider a potential objection: the notion of ‘fit-with-use’ in Lewis’s reference 
magnetism is vague. To reply, I attempt to sketch a simple modification to make sense 
of the notion. 
 
  
                                               
2 This conception of states of affairs is suggested by Dan Marshall. I am indebted to him for this. 
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CHAPTER 1  SIDER’S REDUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF NECESSITY 
 
 
This chapter introduces Sider’s reductive account of necessity. In section 1.1, I outline 
Sider’s reductive account. In section 1.2, I formulate his analysis of the necessity of a 
micro-reduction truth. In sections 1.3 & 1.4, in order to elucidate his analysis, I 
articulate the notion of a metaphysical semantics and some relevant notions. In section 
1.5, I finish this chapter by reconstructing his analysis and show how it accounts for 
the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. 
 
 
1. Sider’s Reductive Account of Necessity3 
In his book Writing the Book of the World (2011, chapter 12), Theodore Sider puts 
forth a new reductive account of metaphysical necessity.4 Metaphysical necessity 
(necessity for short), in the sense of contemporary metaphysics, is generally but not 
universally understood as the most general kind of necessity: a truth is metaphysically 
necessary iff it is true in all possible situations. There are two main features of Sider’s 
account. First, Sider argues that necessity is reducible. He claims that necessity is 
metaphysically non-fundamental since it “is unneeded for the most fundamental 
inquiries of metaphysics” (2011, 267). He makes a controversial analogy to support 
his claim: “just as scientists tend not to treat psychological, economic and political 
notions as being necessary for the most fundamental inquiries of mathematics and 
physics, so philosophers tend not to treat semantic, moral, epistemic, causal and modal 
notions as being necessary for the most fundamental inquiries of metaphysics” (2011, 
267). The second feature is that necessity is identified with the “certain kinds” of truths. 
Roughly speaking, for a sentence S to be necessary is for S to be a mathematical truth, 
or a law of metaphysics, or an analytic truth, or a natural-kind truth, or a micro-
                                               
3 Sider named his account (modal) Humeanism: “I prefer a third strategy for reducing modality, which 
I’ll call Humean, for lack of a better word”. (Sider 2011, 269) But just to avoid confusion with 
Humeanism in other philosophical areas, I will stick to Sider’s reductive account of necessity or Sider’s 
account for short. 
4 Sider briefly mentions his reductive account of modality in his “Reductive Theories of Modality” 
(2003 sec 4) and “Against Parthood” (2013a, sec 10) where he employs his account to argue against the 
argument from the possibility of gunk. 
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reduction truth, or a de re modal truth, or a logical consequence of such truths. 
 Before Sider, a number of metaphysicians had proposed different accounts to 
define necessity as truths in all possible worlds. Their views diverge only in terms of 
the nature of possible worlds. David Lewis (1986, sections 1.2-1.6) holds a concrete 
conception of possible world: possible worlds are identified as spatiotemporally and 
causally isolated entities. Unlike Lewis, abstractionists hold an abstract conception of 
possible world: possible worlds are identified as abstract entities—the maximal 
consistent sets of propositions, sentences, states of affairs, and so on. 5  David 
Armstrong (1989) holds a combinatorial conception of possible world: possible worlds 
are identified as combinations of the elements of the actual world. 
 Compared with the theories of possible worlds mentioned, there are a number of 
(alleged) theoretical merits in favor of Sider’s account. Sider’s account, if successful, 
gives a non-circular reduction of necessity. This alone is a significant achievement.6 
Sider’s account, if successful, offers a parsimonious ontology and ideology since it 
avoids commitment of the existence of Lewisian possible worlds and taking modality 
as a primitive notion. Sider’s account, if successful, enriches our understanding of the 
notion of metaphysical necessity. However, Sider’s account will be flawed unless it 
defines each of the ‘certain kinds’ of truths nonmodally, and the definitions in question 
must be plausibly true. Otherwise, Sider’s account loses its (alleged) theoretical merits. 
So far, it is not immediately obvious that Sider’s account can actually accomplish this. 
 Let us present the reduction of necessity proposed by Sider. According to his 
account, necessity is reductively defined in terms of the following formulations (D1) 
and (D2): 
 
(D1) A sentence S is a necessary truth iff S is a logical consequence of the modal 
axioms. 
 
(D2) A sentence S is a modal axiom iff S is either  
                                               
5 See Plantiga (1974; 1976) and Adam (1974) for defenses of this view. 
6 David Lewis (1986, ch. 1) argues that only his theory of possible worlds can offer a non-circular 
reduction of modality and that it is one of the reasons to believe his modal realism. However, a number 
of philosophers reject this claim. For example, Marshall (2016) recently proposes a different criticism 
of Lewis’s modal realism. 
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i) a mathematical truth, 
ii) a law of metaphysics, 
iii) an analytic truth, 
iv) a natural-kind truth, 
v) a micro-reduction truth, or 
vi) a de re modal truth.7 
 
Let us assume that S is written in a natural language, say English. On Sider’s view, a 
sentence S in English is a necessary truth iff S in English is a mathematical truth, or a 
law of metaphysics, or an analytic truth, or a natural-kind truth, or a micro-reduction 
truth, or a de re modal truth, or a logical consequence of such truths. (D1) and (D2) 
are the identification of necessity. In what follows, let us briefly discuss each of these 
kinds of truths. 
 
Logical Consequences 
Sider claims that the notion of a logical consequence can be explained in terms of a 
model-theoretic account (2011, 273). According to this account, a sentence S is a 
logical consequence of a set of sentences K1,K2,…Kn iff there is no model in which 
K1,K2,…Kn are true and S is false. Alternatively, he proposes an attempted analysis of 
the notion of a logical consequence in terms of Lewis’s account of lawhood. 8 
According to Sider’s attempted analysis, a sentence S is a logical consequence of 
K1,K2,…Kn iff S is entailed from K1,K2,…Kn on the basis of the laws of logic. For the 
laws of logic, it is defined in terms of a regularity in the best deductive system that 
achieves the best combination of simplicity and strength. Either way, he does not take 
the notion of a logical consequence to be metaphysically basic. 
 
Mathematical Truths 
Sider’s definition of a mathematical truth is pretty simple. A sentence S is a 
mathematical truth iff S concerns only mathematics and S is true (Sider 2011, 273). 
                                               
7 A trivial point: Sider’s (2011) original text uses “proposition” as the bearer of modal properties. But 
without further elaborations of my metaphysical assumption of proposition, let us stick to “sentence”. 





On Sider’s view, analytic truths are defined as the following: a sentence S is an analytic 
truth iff S is true and definitional (2011, 274; 193). 9  Sider provides no further 
definition of the notion of definitionality. He only describes that such a notion can be 
roughly understood as a constraint on the meaning of an expression. For example, the 
sentence ‘Every vixen is a female fox’ is an analytic truth since it is true and has a 
definitional constraint on ‘vixen’. When a competent speaker of English interprets 
‘vixen’, the interpretation made by the speaker has certain “definitional constraint” on 
the meaning of ‘vixen’. It is worth noting that Sider’s notion of analyticity carries no 
commitment to “truth by convention” in the traditional sense of analyticity.10 On his 
view, truth and definitionality come apart. Analytic sentences are just the sentences 
that both are true and definitional. At any rate, we will consider a modified analysis to 
explain the necessity of an analytic truth in chapter 3. 
 
Laws of Metaphysics 
Sider’s account of metaphysical laws is similar to Lewis’s account of lawhood (2011, 
275).11 His definition of a metaphysical law is presumably of the form: 
 
(ML) A sentence S is a metaphysical law iff S is a regularity in the best system, 
where a best system is a deductive system that achieves the best combination of 
simplicity and strength. 
 
How to balance simplicity and strength is an important matter. If complexity is cheap, 
then special-science regularities counts as laws. If complexity is expensive, then only 
laws of logic count as laws. (Recall his proposed definition of the notion of a logical 
consequence.) If complexity is made somewhere in between special-science 
regularities and laws of logic, then laws of physics count as laws. The central claim of 
his account of a metaphysical law: if a cost of complexity is made intermediate 
                                               
9 For more, see Sider (2011, sections 12.4; 9.8). 
10 A popular version of truth by convention is defended by Ayer’s (1936, 31-87). 
11 See Lewis (1973; 1983; 1986; 1994), and Sider (2011 sections 3.1; 12.5). 
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between laws of logic and laws of physics, then laws of metaphysics count as laws and 
laws of physics drop out. 
 Sider also claims that sentences of fundamental metaphysics are to be necessarily 
true if true or necessarily false if false. Possible examples of metaphysical laws are 
these: 
 
Parthood is transitive. 
There are no past or future objects. 
Objects have temporal parts. 
Any objects have a mereological sum.12 
 
Sider’s account of a metaphysical law is neutral as to whether ‘parthood is transitive’ 
is true or its negation is true. On his view, it does not matter whether parthood is 




A typical example of natural-kind truths is this: Every water molecule is a H2O 
molecule. Sider’s definition is as follows: A sentence S is a natural-kind truth iff S is a 
sentence of the form ⸢"x(Fx→Gx)⸣, where F is a natural-kind term and G expresses 
the deep explanatory feature of the property expressed by F (Sider 2011, 283). One 
might find “the deep explanatory feature” obscure and even perhaps redundant. For 
example, it might be simpler to say instead: a sentence S is a natural-kind truth iff S is 
a sentence of the form ⸢"x(Fx→Gx)⸣, where F is a natural-kind term and G expresses 
the same property as F. For present purposes, however, we will not proceed any further 
for this. As we will see, chapter 3 proposes a modified analysis to explain the necessity 
of a natural-kind truth. 
 
De Re Modal Truths 
This is a standard way to define de re modality: a sentence S is a de re modal sentence 
                                               
12 The examples come from Sider (2011, 274).  
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if S is a sentence of the form ⸢□Fa⸣ or ⸢$x□(Fx)⸣. Sider basically adopts this standard 
and attempts to specify it. According to Sider, a sentence S is a de re modal truth iff i) 
S is true and ii) S is a sentence of the form ⸢□Fa⸣ or ⸢$x□(Fx)⸣.  
 The first kind of de re modal truths is of the form: ⸢□Fa⸣. Following Kripke’s 
(1972, 106-143) famous examples, Sider further specifies different types of ‘□Fa’: i) 
‘Necessarily, a is F’ where a is a proper name and F is a sortal predicate, ii) 
‘Necessarily, a is F’ where a is a proper name and F specifies material origins, or iii) 
‘Necessarily, a is b’ where a and b are proper names (2011, 287). ‘Donald Trump is a 
human’ is an example of the form i). Let ‘A’ be a name of the table in front of me and 
let ‘B’ abbreviate the piece of wood. Suppose that ‘A’ is actually made from ‘B’. Then 
‘A is B’ is a de re modal truth of the form ii). Finally, ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is of 
the form iii). 
 The second kind of de re modal truths is of the form: ⸢$x□(Fx)⸣. This is a sentence 
that contains a variable inside the scope of a modal operator which is bound to a 
quantifier outside. On Sider’s view, this kind of de re modality can accommodate with 
the above categories i)-iii) by some modification.13 
 It might be argued that Sider’s definition of de re necessity is too narrow. For the 
sake of argument, let us suppose that being a cartoon mouse is an essential property of 
Mickey Mouse. On this basis, the sentence ‘Necessarily, Mickey Mouse is a cartoon 
mouse’ is a de re modal truth. But according to the definition suggested by Sider, it is 
not obvious that the sentence is of a de re modal truth, depending on what he means 
by a “sortal” predicate. 
 However, Sider claims that the above syntactic definition is just one approach he 
could take to define de re necessity. An alternative approach to define de re modal 
truths is to appeal to Lewis’s counterpart theory.14 
 
Micro-reduction Truths 
We will give an in-depth study of the notion of a micro-reduction truth in the rest of 
                                               
13 Sider claims that the modification can be made by adopting Tarskian truth-theory to assign truth-
conditions to sentences with free variables. But for present purposes, we will not discuss this 
complication. 





Before moving on to Sider’s definition of a micro-reduction truth, it is worth 
mentioning a novel feature of Sider’s reductive account. On this account, there is no 
underlying unification of the ‘certain kinds’ of truths. The following quotations of 
Sider manifest the non-unifying feature of his account of necessity. 
 
“What determines the “certain sort” of propositions? Nothing “metaphysically 
deep”. For the Humean, necessity does not carve at the joints. There are many 
candidate meanings for ‘necessary’, corresponding to different “certain sorts” our 
linguistic community might choose. Since none of these candidates carves at the 
joints, our linguistic community is free to choose whichever of these it likes. 
Perhaps the choice is arbitrary[.]” (2011, 269) 
 
“The Humean shares the conventionalist’s goal of accounting for modality in a 
fundamentally amodal world. To that end, it’s important that the “certain sorts” 
of propositions invoked by the Humean are not objectively distinguished, that no 
joint in reality encircles the class of logical and mathematical truths. So what does 
select this class? Something about us, says the Humean. Perhaps the choice of the 
“certain sorts” is conventional.” (2011, 270) 
 
“The core idea of the Humean account, then, is that necessary truths are truths of 
certain more or less arbitrarily selected kinds.” (2011, 271) 
 
As we have seen from the quotations, Sider’s account does not intend to explain 
necessity by formulating a single necessary and sufficient condition for being the 
‘certain kinds’ of truths. Sider is perfectly willing to admit that the identification of 
necessity with the ‘certain kinds’ of truths is more or less heterogeneous. The import 
of the identification is to reflect ipso facto our linguistic behaviors and conventions of 
what to mean by the word ‘necessity’. 
 Having concisely described Sider’s reductive account and each of the ‘certain 
kinds’ of truths, we will proceed to articulate Sider’s definition of a micro-reduction 





2. Sider’s Analysis of the Necessity of a Micro-reduction Truth 
Let ‘C0’ be a complex predicate which describes the actual microphysical states of 
New York City in every detail. On any reasonable account, (C) is surely necessary. 
 
(C) Every C0 is a city.  
A logical form of (C): "x(C0 x→city x). 
 
According to Sider’s account, (C) is a necessary truth since (C) is a logical 
consequence of a micro-reduction truth. Let us recall the reduction of necessity (D1) 
and (D2) provided above. 
 
(D1) A sentence S is a necessary truth iff S is a logical consequence of the modal 
axioms. 
 
(D2) A sentence S is a modal axiom iff S is either i) a mathematical truth, ii) a law 
of metaphysics, iii) an analytic truth, iv) a natural-kind truth, v) a micro-
reduction truth, or vi) a de re modal truth. 
 
Putting all together, Sider argues that since (C) is a logical consequence of a micro-
reduction truth, (C) is a necessary truth. From there, Sider’s account is said to give a 
reductive analysis of the necessity of (C). 
 However, it is not immediately clear exactly what a micro-reduction truth is like. 
Therefore, Sider attempts to define the notion of a micro-reduction truth in terms of 
the following. 
 
(D3) A sentence S is a micro-reduction truth iff for a true metaphysical 
semantics M, and for an application axiom A in M, S corresponds to A. 
 
At a first glance, it is difficult to fully understand (D3) without further elaborations. In 
order to properly understand (D3), I begin in exegetical mode by clarifying each of the 
technical terms such as “metaphysical semantics”, “application axiom” and 






3. Defining Metaphysical Semantics 
In his (2011, section 7.4), Sider develops his metaphysical semantics to shed light on 
the problem of fundamentality: in what way do non-fundamental facts hold in virtue 
of fundamental facts? 15  Before proceeding, I shall outline Sider’s theory of 
fundamentality and how he thinks of the relation between the fundamental and the 
non-fundamental.  
 
Sider’s Theory of Fundamentality16 
When metaphysicians talk about fundamentality, they talk about the idea that there is 
something metaphysically basic or rock-bottom in the world. In general, they all agree 
that fundamental facts are metaphysically basic or rock-bottom facts, but they hold 
different views about what fundamental facts are like. On Sider’s view, facts about 
subatomic particles are fundamental facts, whereas facts about someone’s walking in 
a park are non-fundamental facts. But this is merely an intuitive distinction between 
the fundamental and the non-fundamental. To make the distinction more precisely, 
Sider makes two claims about the fundamental and non-fundamental truths: 
Completeness and Purity. 
 
Completeness 




“Fundamental truths involve only fundamental notions.” (2011, 106) 
 
                                               
15 For more, see Sider’s (2011, chapter 7) 
16 My presentation of Sider’s theory of fundamentality is sketchy and incomplete. For example, I have 
passed over other alternative approaches to the nature of ‘hold in virtue of’, such as grounding approach. 
For more on grounding, see Fine (2001; 2010; 2012); Rosen (2010); Schaffer (2009); anthology by 




Consider the truth that there is a city. Given Purity, the truth that there is a city is a 
non-fundamental truth since it contains a non-fundamental term ‘city’, and it expresses 
a non-fundamental notion. Given Completeness, the truth that there is a city must hold 
in virtue of some fundamental truths. However, there seems to be a problem. How do 
non-fundamental truths “hold in virtue of” fundamental truths? In other words, what 
is the connection between the fundamental and the non-fundamental? To explain the 
nature of the connection in question, Sider proposes a metaphysical type of semantic 
theory—“Metaphysical Semantics”. He defines ‘hold in virtue of’ in terms of his 
metaphysical semantics as follows.  
 
Completeness (new version) 
“Every sentence that contains expressions that do not carve at the joints has a 
metaphysical semantics” (2011, 116). 
 
This new version of Completeness makes a new requirement of being fundamental. 
The basic idea of Sider’s metaphysical semantics is that for any non-fundamental term 
T, there is a metaphysical semantics that gives a meaning to T in fundamental language. 
Given the new version of Completeness, Sider’s metaphysical semantics, if successful, 
in principle can describe the non-fundamental story of the world by using only 
fundamental terms. However, it is natural to wonder how exactly Sider’s metaphysical 




So much for the theory of fundamentality. I hope that the brief presentation outlined 
above has helped to clarify Sider’s underlying motivation for developing an account 
of how the fundamental the non-fundamental are connected to each other. As we have 
just seen, his metaphysical semantics is a metaphysical type of semantic theory (that 
takes the form of a truth theory) which explains how the fundamental and the non-
fundamental are connected to each other. The definition of Sider’s metaphysical 




(D4) M is a metaphysical semantics iff 
(1) M takes the form of a truth theory, 
(2) M is true, 
(3) Every sentence 𝜙 in the meta-language of M must be stated in purely 
fundamental expressions, and 
(4) All the T-theorems of M must be explanatory. 
 
The First Characterization 
Sider defines the notion of a metaphysical semantics as a certain type of semantic 
theory. But what type of theories of meaning does his metaphysical semantics actually 
take, given that there are a considerable number of such theories? Here is a suggestion 
from Sider. 
 
“A metaphysical semantics is a semantic theory with two distinctive features. 
First, meanings are to be given in purely joint-carving terms. For example, if the 
semantic theory takes the form of a truth-theory, then the truth-conditions must 
be stated in perfectly joint-carving terms” (2011, 112 my emphasis).  
 
The quotation suggests that Sider’s metaphysical semantics takes the form of a truth 
theory. Here, I assume that the type of semantic theory in question is Donald 
Davidson’s (1967) theory of meaning.17  
 In order to understand Sider’s metaphysical semantics, let us briefly outline 
Davidson’s theory of meaning. In his (1967) “Truth and Meaning”, Davidson claims 
that the notion of meaning is best understood in terms of the notion of truth. He also 
claims that a theory of truth which specifies the truth conditions for all sentences of a 
language would provide sufficient knowledge to specify the meanings for all sentences 
of the language in question. In this sense, to give the truth conditions for a sentence is 
to give the meanings for the sentence under consideration. To develop a theory of 
meaning which enables us to generate theorems that specify the truth conditions for 
                                               
17  A remark. In this thesis, I will assume that Sider’s metaphysical semantics take the form of 
Davidson’s truth theory, unless there is strong evidence to show otherwise. Although Sider (2011) has 
never explicitly claimed whether his metaphysical semantics takes the form of Davidson’s version or 
other versions of theories of meaning, it seems to me that Sider’s metaphysical semantics as presented 
in (2011) goes hand in hand with Davidson’s theory of meaning. 
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all sentences of a language, Davidson adopts Tarski’s (1936) theory of truth and 
defines the notion of meaning in terms of Tarski’s definition of truth—known as 
Convention T. Given Tarski’s Convention T, Davidson’s theory of meaning yields a 
theorem of the form: 
 
S is true iff P. 
 
Theorems of this form are generally called T-theorems. The function of a T-theorem is 
to give meanings to each sentence of a natural language. In a T-theorem, ‘S’ is a name 
of any sentence of the object-language and ‘P’ is a sentence in the meta-language. The 
object-language is a language for which we try to give meanings and the meta-
language is a language which translates the object-language. There is no constraint 
whether the object- and meta-language have to be identical or different. It is 
permissible to give the meanings for English sentences (object-language) in English 
sentences (meta-language). In this case, Davidson’s theory of meaning would yield a 
T-theorem like this: 
 
‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white. 
 
It is also permissible to give the meanings for German sentences (object-language) in 
English sentences (meta-language). In this case, Davidson’s theory of meaning would 
yield a T-theorem like this: 
 
‘Schnee ist weiss’ is true iff snow is white.18 
 
So far, we have presented some basic ideas of Davidson’s theory of meaning. Now let 
us return to Sider’s metaphysical semantics. 
 Sider attempts to explain the connection between the fundamental and non-
fundamental in terms of the notion of a metaphysical semantics. Like Davidson who 
claims Tarski’s theory of truth which specifies the truth conditions for all sentences of 
                                               




a language would provide sufficient knowledge to give the meanings for all sentences 
of the language under study, Sider makes a similar claim that Davidson’s theory of 
meaning which gives the meanings of all sentences of a natural language would 
provide sufficient knowledge to give the meanings of all sentences of a non-
fundamental language. Unlike Davidson’s theory of meaning, the object-language for 
which Sider tries to give the meaning is a non-fundamental language, and the meta-
language is a fundamental language.19 For Sider’s metaphysical semantics, to give a 
“metaphysical” truth-condition for a sentence of non-fundamental language is to give 
a meaning to the sentence in question.  
 A metaphysical semantics of a language begins by stipulating a number of axioms 
that assign meanings to each of the lexical items in that language, yielding T-theorems 
of the form: 
 
T-theorem: S is true iff 𝜙. 
 
In T-theorems of a metaphysical semantics, ‘S’ is a name of a sentence in non-
fundamental language for which we are trying to give meanings, and ‘𝜙’ is a sentence 
in fundamental language which translates S in non-fundamental language. By yielding 
T-theorems, Sider claims that a metaphysical semantics can give meanings to each 
sentence of non-fundamental language in fundamental language. Given Sider’s 
metaphysical semantics, we get a better grip on how the non-fundamental connects to 
the fundamental: they are semantically connected to each other by a metaphysical 
semantics.20 
                                               
19 Another difference between Davidson’s theory of meaning and Sider’s metaphysical semantics 
concerns with the conception of “meaning”. The former holds a Fregean traditional conception of 
sentence-meaning where the meaning of a sentence is an object of thought or a propositional attitude or 
whatever is like, that concerns with the objective, strict and literal meaning of the sentence. However, 
this is an open question whether or not Sider would take the traditional one. I think he probably does 
not endorse the traditional conception of meaning. Also, I am unsure which conception of meaning 
Sider would take, and what Sider means by ‘meaning’ in his metaphysical semantics. In section 2.5, we 
will see that this unclarity leads to a problem of explanatory power in Sider’s metaphysical semantics 
20 In fact, it is still unclear to me how ‘𝜙’ gives meanings for ‘S’ and I have a hard time understanding 
how the non-fundamental and the fundamental are “semantically” connected to one another by a 
metaphysical semantics. Do they have same meaning by expressing the same proposition or state of 
affairs? Or do they have same meaning by having the same mental state of the speaker? These are 




The Second Characterization 
As we have mentioned, Sider’s metaphysical semantics takes the form of a truth theory.  
As a result, the ‘iff’ in the T-theorems is best plausibly understood as the material 
biconditionals. 
 
The Third Characterization 
Sider requires that every sentence 𝜙 in the meta-language of a metaphysical semantics 
must be stated in purely fundamental expressions. It is an essential element of his 
metaphysical semantics. As just mentioned, a metaphysical semantics gives meanings 
to each sentence of non-fundamental language in purely fundamental language. Hence, 
𝜙 must be written in fundamental language. As Sider puts it explicitly,  
 
“Metaphysical semantics is more ambitious in that by giving meanings in 
fundamental terms, it seeks to achieve something not sought by linguistic 
semantics: to show how what we say fits into fundamental reality.” (2011, 112)  
 
“The requirement that meanings are ‘given’ in purely joint-carving terms amounts 
to the requirement that 𝜙 be phrased in purely joint-carving terms” (2011, 113). 
 
For Sider, predicates like “is fundamental” and “is joint-carving” are synonymous. But 
what are fundamental expressions? Based on Purity (fundamental truths involve only 
fundamental notions), here is my best guess: 
 
An expression is fundamental iff it expresses a fundamental notion. 
 
For instance, the expression ‘city’ is counted as a non-fundamental expression because 
it expresses a non-fundamental notion, whereas the expression ‘charge’ is counted as 
a fundamental term because it expresses a fundamental notion. But what are 
fundamental notions? For Sider, ‘is fundamental’ is a primitive notion. In his (2011, 
chapter 13), Sider illustrates rather than defining all his primitive ideologies. Let us 




1. First-order logical constants (‘"’, ‘¬’, ‘Ú’, ‘=’, etc.), 
 
2. Predicates of fundamental physics (‘is a unit negative charge’, ‘is quark 
flavors’, ‘is a mass’, etc.) 
 
3. Predicate ‘Î’ for set-membership, and 
 
4. The notion of structure (‘is fundamental’) 
 
Sider’s illustration of his primitive ideologies helps to explain which notion counts as 
fundamental or non-fundamental. From there, we can roughly distinguish the 
fundamental and the non-fundamental notions by this: 
 
A notion is fundamental iff it is expressed by either (1), (2), (3), or (4); 
 
In any case, this is Sider’s illustration of a fundamental notion.21 Though it may be 
debatable, it helps to illustrate which notion counts as fundamental or non-fundamental 
in terms of his theory of fundamentality. For example, the notion ‘city’ is non-
fundamental because it is expressed the expression ‘city’ and such an expression does 
not belong to either (1), (2), (3) or (4). By contrast, the notion ‘mass’ is fundamental 
because it is expressed by the expression ‘mass’ and such an expression belongs to (2).  
 Since Sider requires that every sentence 𝜙 in a metaphysical semantics must only 
be written in fundamental expressions, 𝜙 can only be written in first-order logical 
constants, predicates of fundamental physics, set-membership predicate, the notion of 
structure, and nothing else. 
 
The Fourth Characterization 
Sider’s metaphysical semantics requires that all the T-theorems must be explanatory. 
                                               
21 There are good reasons to think that Sider’s illustration of a fundamental notion is disputable. For 
there could have been other instantiated fundamental properties. For example, being a color might be 
an instantiated fundamental property, according to some theory of color. Similarly, consciousness might 
be an instantiated fundamental property, according to dualism. And so on. 
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At bottom, a metaphysical semantics is an explanation of how the fundamental and 
the non-fundamental are connected to each other. He defines the notion of a 
metaphysical semantics to be a semantic theory whose job is to yield its T-theorems 
that give meanings to each sentence of non-fundamental language in fundamental 
language. Just as a theory of meaning seeks to explain our linguistic phenomena, a 
metaphysical semantics must in some sense explain our linguistic phenomena.22 In 
this regard, Sider writes: 
 
“A metaphysical semantics must successfully explain the linguistic behavior of 
the population in question [.]” (2011, 114) 
 
Let us set this aside and assume for the sake of argument that Sider’s metaphysical 
semantics is an (alleged) explanatory theory. As we will see in chapter 2, it is probably 
not the case. 
 Instead of trying to validate that Sider’s metaphysical semantics is an explanatory 
theory, let us procced to how a metaphysical semantics generates its T-theorems and 
gives meanings to each sentence of non-fundamental language in fundamental 
language. 
 To start off, we need to set up a set of axioms that assign meanings to each of the 
lexical items in a given language. Let us stipulate our language to be English. For the 
sake of simplicity, we will simplify our language where there are two lexical items: 
one name ‘New York City’ and one predicate ‘is a city’. For any name, there is a 
reference axiom ⸢‘New York City’ refers to New York City⸣. For any predicate, there 
is an application axiom ⸢"x(‘is a city’ applies to x ↔ 𝜙x)⸣. To build up an atomic 
sentence, we need another axiom to combine references and predicates. Hence, there 
is a compositionality axiom: ⸢For any ‘a’, and for any ‘F’, ‘aF’ is true iff ‘F’ applies 
to the reference of ‘a’⸣. From there, we are able to derive the T-theorems from these 
                                               
22 Sider points out that the explanatory goals between his metaphysical semantics and a theory of 
meaning are different. Unlike a theory of meaning in general, what a metaphysical semantics tries to 
explain is more modest. For example, it does not aspire to integrate with theories of cognitive science, 
psychology, syntactic theory, theories of action and rationality, and so on (Sider 2011, 112-113). How 
exactly does a metaphysical semantics explain linguistic phenomena? It is an important matter, but we 
will not proceed further until chapter 2.  
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axioms. An illustration of a metaphysical semantics for our simplified English looks 
like this: 
 
Reference Axiom: ‘New York City’ refers to New York City. 
 
Application Axiom: "x(‘is a city’ applies to x ↔ 𝜙x). 
 
Compositionality Axiom: For any name ‘a’, and for any predicate ‘F’, ‘aF’ is true 
in English iff ‘F’ applies to the reference of ‘a’. 
 
T-theorem NY: ‘New York City is a city’ is true in English iff 𝜙. 
 
The T-theorem NY shows that a metaphysical semantics for our simplified English 
gives a meaning to the English sentence ‘New York City is a city’ in perfectly 
fundamental expressions 𝜙. Thus understood, the fundamental and the non-
fundamental are semantically connected to each other by a metaphysical semantics. 
This is the goal of Sider’s metaphysical semantics. 
 After that, Sider quickly recognizes a (potentially fatal) problem for his 
metaphysical semantics, if it takes the form of Davidson’s theory of meaning. Consider 
the following quotation of Sider. 
 
“Returning to metaphysical semantics of the truth-theoretic form: what exactly is 
required of a fundamental truth-condition 𝜙 for a sentence S in [a metaphysical 
semantics]? We know from the literature on Donald Davidson’s approach to 
semantics that sentences 𝜙 and 𝜙′ can have the same truth-value, even necessarily 
so, despite the fact that 𝜙 is an appropriate truth-condition for S while 𝜙′ is not. 
‘Snow is white’ is an appropriate truth-condition in a (nonmetaphysical) 
semantics for ‘Snow is white’; neither ‘Grass is green’ nor ‘Snow is white and 
2+2=4’ is appropriate. A metaphysical semantics must successfully explain the 
linguistic behavior of the population in question, and a truth-theory with 
necessarily true conjuncts tacked onto each of its truth-conditions is presumably 
not explanatory, though it’s a hard question why not. I have no particular answer 
to the question, though I suspect that the approach of section 3.2 is applicable. 
And if the question proves intractable, the metaphysical semanticist could 
abandon the Davidsonian approach. I have chosen that approach largely because 




As Sider said, there is a widely recognized problem in Davidson’s theory of meaning, 
as first pointed out by Foster (1976). The problem is that the theory inevitably entails 
problematic T-theorems of the sort: ⸢‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white and grass 
is green⸣. It is a bizarre consequence of Davidson’s theory of meaning. It is bizarre 
because even though the problematic T-theorem is true, we are hard to see why the 
conjunct ‘grass is green’ contributes anything to the meaning of ‘snow is white’. There 
must be something wrong with Davidson’s claim: 
 
It is this: the definition [of Tarski’s] works by giving necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the truth of every sentence, and to give truth conditions is a way of 
giving the meaning of a sentence. To know the semantic concept of truth for a 
language is to know what it is for a sentence—any sentence—to be true, and this 
amounts, in one good sense we can give to the phrase, to understanding the 
language. (1984, 24) 
 
If Sider’s metaphysical semantics takes the form of Davidson’s theory of meaning, 
then it faces the same problem too. As we can see from the quotation, Sider thinks that 
his metaphysical semantics can avoid the problem by adopting another theory of 
meaning. He claims that Davidson’s theory of meaning is just one form that a 
metaphysical semantics might take. An immediate question: what a non-Davidsonian 
theory of meaning might a metaphysical semantics adopt? Proponents of Sider’s 
metaphysical semantics are invited to explore more on this.  
 We have already gone through the details of Sider’s metaphysical semantics and 
clarified each of the essential features of it. To recapitulate, there are four essential 
features consisting of Sider’s metaphysical semantics: i) it takes the form of a truth 
theory; ii) it must be true in a sense of material biconditionals; iii) it requires that every 
sentence 𝜙 must be stated in purely fundamental terms; iv) all the T-theorems of it 
must be explanatory. Next, we move on to clarify the notions of “application axiom” 
and “correspond to”. 
 
 
4. Defining ‘Application Axiom’ and ‘Correspond to’ 
Let us proceed to the other technical terms: “application axiom” and “correspond to”. 
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To refresh our memory, let us recall Sider’s definition of a micro-reduction truth again: 
 
(D3) A sentence S is a micro-reduction truth iff for a true metaphysical 
semantics M, and for an application axiom A in M, S corresponds to A. 
 
Since we have explained the notion of a metaphysical semantics previously, we will 
go on to articulate ‘application axiom’ and ‘correspond to’ respectively. 
 
Application Axiom 
Actually, we have already seen how an application axiom plays its role in a 
metaphysical semantics in the last section. According to Sider’s official formulation, 
application axioms of a metaphysical semantics have the form: 
 
(a) Predicate ‘F’ applies to an object x iff 𝜙x. (2011, 285) 
 
To grasp (a), it would be better to see what an application axiom of Davidsonian theory 
of meaning looks like:  
 
(b) Predicate ‘F’ applies to an object x iff Fx.  
 
In a Davidsonian theory of meaning, (b) specifies the condition under which, for any 
predicate ‘F’, ‘F’ applies to an object x. To see this, let us try to give a theory of 
meaning for ‘Donald Trump is a human’ in a simplified English. Suppose that this 
simplified English has only two lexical items: one name ‘Donald Trump’ and one 
predicate ‘is a human’. For any name, there is a reference axiom: ⸢Donald Trump’ 
refers to Donald Trump⸣. For any predicate, there is an application axiom: ⸢‘is a human’ 
applies to x ↔ x is a human⸣. Furthermore, there is a compositionality axiom to 
combine references and predicates: ⸢For any ‘a’, and for any ‘F’, ‘aF’ is true iff ‘F’ 
applies to the reference of ‘a’⸣. This can be illustrated as follows: 
 




Application Axiom: ‘is a human’ applies to x ↔ x is a human. 
 
Compositionality Axiom: For any name ‘a’, and for any predicate ‘F’, ‘aF’ is true 
iff ‘F’ applies to the reference of ‘a’. 
 
T-theorem DT: ‘Donald Trump is a human’ is true in English iff Donald Trump is 
a human. 
 
T-theorem DT shows that a Davidsonian theory of meaning for English gives a truth 
condition for the English sentence ‘Donald Trump is a human’ in English. Given that 
the notion of truth is defined in terms of the notion of meaning, it follows that a 
Davidsonian theory of meaning for English gives a meaning to the English sentence 
‘Donald Trump is a human’ in English. This is exactly how an application axiom plays 
its role in a Davidsonian theory of meaning. As we have illustrated in section 1.3, the 
application axiom of a metaphysical semantics does almost exactly the same thing. 
There is a crucial difference between Sider’s metaphysical semantics and a 
Davidsonian theory of meaning. Sider’s metaphysical semantics requires that the right 
bijunct of a metaphysical semantics must be phrased in purely fundamental 
expressions mentioned in section 1.3. Unlike (b), (a) is required to specify the 
condition under which for any predicate ‘F’, ‘F’ applies to an object x iff x is 𝜙, where 
𝜙 is phrased in purely fundamental expressions. So, let us formulate (D5) as a 
proposed definition of an application axiom of Sider’s metaphysical semantics. 
 
(D5) A sentence S is an application axiom of a true metaphysical semantics M iff 
S is a sentence of the form ⸢"x(‘F’ applies to x↔𝜙x)⸣ and S is an axiom of M. 
 
Corresponding to 
Having explained ‘application axiom’, we proceed with explaining ‘correspond to’. 




(D6) A sentence S corresponds to an ⸢application axiom⸣ of a true metaphysical 
semantics M iff S is a sentence of the form ⸢"x(Fx↔𝜙x)⸣ and ⸢"x(‘F’ applies to 
x↔𝜙x)⸣ is an application axiom in M. 
 
As we have seen, (C) is a necessary truth. 
 
(C) Every C0 is a city. 
 
But (C) does not seem to be a mathematical truth, or a law of metaphysics, or a natural 
kind truth, or an analytic truth, or a de re modal truth or a logical consequence of such 
truths. How does Sider account for such a necessity? His answer is that (C) is a logical 
consequence of a micro-reduction truth. After that, he defines a micro-reduction truth 
to be a sentence of the form ⸢"x(Fx↔𝜙x)⸣, and explains that it corresponds to the 
application axiom of a true metaphysical semantics. This is the idea of (D6). As Sider 
puts it, 
 
“This problem [the problem of how the necessity of a micro-reduction truth 
should be explained] threatens the Hmuean as well, since sentences like (C) do 
not seem to be mathematical truths, analytic truths, laws of metaphysics, natural 
kind axioms or logical consequences of such sentences. 
 
The Humean should introduce another group of modal axioms, derived from a 
theory of metaphysical truth-conditions for the language in question. There are, I 
assume, metaphysical truth-conditions for statements about cities, smiles, and 
candy. The metaphysical semantics generating these metaphysical truth-
conditions, let’s assume, contains axioms of the form “Predicate F applies to 
object x iff 𝜙(x)”, where F may be ‘city’, ‘smile’, ‘candy’, and so on, and where 
𝜙(x) is phrased in purely fundamental terms. For each such axiom of the 
metaphysical semantics, we should add a corresponding modal axiom: 
"x(Fx↔𝜙x).” (Sider 2011, 285)  
 
According to the quotation of Sider, he suggests that there is an application axiom in 
a metaphysical semantics: ⸢"x(‘F’ applies to x↔𝜙x)⸣. This has already manifested in 
(D5). He then defines a micro-reduction truth as a sentence of the form: ⸢"x(Fx↔𝜙x)⸣, 
which corresponds to the application axiom ⸢"x(‘F’ applies to x↔𝜙x)⸣ of a true 
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metaphysical semantics. This is the idea of saying that ⸢"x(Fx↔𝜙x)⸣ corresponds to 
the application axiom of a true metaphysical semantics and is the sentential form of 
Sider’s definition of a micro-reduction truth.  
 
 
5. Revisiting Sider’s Analysis of the Necessity of a Micro-reduction 
Truth 
In the previous sections, we have clarified the technical terms ‘metaphysical 
semantics’, ‘application axiom’, and ‘correspond to’. Now, we are in the position to 
understand Sider’s analysis of the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. Sider’s analysis 
runs as follows: 
 
(D1) A sentence S is a necessary truth iff S is a logical consequence of the modal 
axioms. 
 
(D2) A sentence S is a modal axiom iff S is either i) a mathematical truth, ii) a law 
of metaphysics, iii) an analytic truth, iv) a natural-kind truth, v) a micro-
reduction truth, or vi) a de re modal truth. 
 
(D1) and (D2) are of Sider’s account of necessity. He then defines a micro-reduction 
truth as (D3). 
 
(D3) A sentence S is a micro-reduction truth iff for a true metaphysical semantics 
M, and for an application axiom A in M, S corresponds to A. 
 
To understand (D3), we have to understand what it is meant by ‘metaphysical 
semantics’, ‘application axiom’ and ‘correspond to’. In section 1.3, we have therefore 
provided a suggested definition of Sider’s metaphysical semantics. 
 
(D4) M is a metaphysical semantics iff (1) M takes the form of a truth theory, (2) 
M is true, (3) every sentence 𝜙 in the meta-language of M must be stated in purely 
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fundamental expressions, and (4) all the T-theorems of M must be explanatory. 
 
In section 1.4, we have also defined and interpreted ‘application axiom’ and 
‘correspond to’ as (D5) and (D6). 
 
(D5) A sentence S is an application axiom of a true metaphysical semantics M iff 
S is a sentence of the form ⸢"x(‘F’ applies to x↔𝜙x)⸣ and S is an axiom of M. 
 
(D6) A sentence S corresponds to an ⸢application axiom⸣ of a true metaphysical 
semantics M iff S is a sentence of the form ⸢"x(Fx↔𝜙x)⸣ and ⸢"x(‘F’ applies to 
x↔𝜙x)⸣ is an application axiom in M. 
 
Putting (D4)-(D6) together, we are in the position to understand (D3). Let us rephrase 
(D3) more succinctly into (D7). 
 
(D7) A sentence S is a micro-reduction truth iff for a true metaphysical semantics 
M, and for an application axiom ⸢"x(‘F’ applies to x↔𝜙x)⸣ A in M, S is a sentence 
of the form ⸢"x(Fx↔𝜙x)⸣ that corresponds to A in M. 
 
However, it is obvious that ⸢"x(Fx↔𝜙x)⸣ is the sentential form of Sider’s definition 
of a micro-reduction truth and itself has no semantic value because ‘F’ and ‘𝜙’ just 
predicate letters without any particular meaning. They will have some particular 
meanings when they get assigned meanings in an interpretation. Similarly, just by (D7) 
alone, Sider still cannot account for the necessity of (C). For it tells us nothing as to 
whether or not (C) count as being necessary. But he claims that this problem can be 
solved. To accomplish it, we substitute the predicate ‘is a city’ for ‘F’ and some 







If a metaphysical semantics for English can give a meaning to an English sentence ‘x 
is a city’ in perfectly fundamental expressions 𝜙, then 𝜙 must cover every conceivable 
circumstance where a city is like. Since clearly there are infinitely many ways a city 
could be, 𝜙 must fit with intuitively correct usage of ‘is a city’ by holding in every 
conceivable circumstance. Since Sider allows that the language of 𝜙 could be infinite, 
let us assume that ⸢"x(x is a city↔𝜙x)⸣ should be properly written as (T'): 
 
(T') "x[city(x)↔𝜙1(x) Ú 𝜙2(x) Ú 𝜙3(x) Ú 𝜙4(x) Ú 𝜙5(x) Ú… 𝜙n(x)]23 
 
where ‘𝜙1(x)’ is a (complex) formula which describes the actual microphysical states 
of Los Angeles, ‘𝜙2(x)’ is a (complex) formula which describes the actual 
microphysical states of Chicago, ‘𝜙3(x)’ is a (complex) formula which describes the 
actual microphysical states of Houston, and so forth. Thus, Sider claims that in this 
case, the actual microphysical states of New York City—C0—will be one of the ‘𝜙s(x)’. 
It is this. 
 
(T'') "x[city(x)↔C0(x) Ú 𝜙1(x) Ú 𝜙2(x) Ú 𝜙3(x) Ú 𝜙4(x) Ú 𝜙5(x) Ú… 𝜙n(x)]. 
 
Of course, Sider cannot fully specify the details of each of the disjuncts including ‘C0’ 
in the right-hand side. Presumably, the specification will be infinitely open-ended. 
Even so, Sider contends that given (T''), this toy-model of a metaphysical semantics 
has already provided sufficient resource to account for the necessitation of (C). The 
idea is that (C) is necessary because (C) is a logical consequence of (T''). 
  To see this, let us demonstrate how (C) is logically derived from (T''). To 
improve readability, let us simplify (T'') into ⸢"x(city(x)↔𝜙*(x)⸣, and let ‘𝜙*(x)’ be 
an abbreviation of ‘C0(x) Ú 𝜙1(x) Ú 𝜙2(x) Ú 𝜙3(x) Ú 𝜙4(x) Ú 𝜙5(x) Ú… 𝜙n(x)’.24 Here 
is a proof: 
 
                                               
23 See Sider (2011, 285 footnote 36) 
24 ‘𝜙*(x)’ should be read as a shorthand for the infinite disjunction of all possible situations in which a 
city is like. The actual microstate of New York City ‘C0’ is just one of the infinite disjuncts. 
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1. "x[city(x)↔𝜙*(x)] Modal axiom 
2. City(x)↔𝜙*(x) Universal Quantifier Elimination 1 
3. 𝜙*(x)→City(x) Biconditional Elimination 2 
4. C0(x) Hypothesis 
5. 𝜙*(x) Disjunction Introduction 4 
6. City(x) Implication Elimination 3, 5 
7. C0(x)→City(x) Implication Introduction 4, 6 
8. "x[C0(x)→city(x)] Universal Quantifier Introduction 7 
 
This natural deduction validates that ⸢"x(C0(x)→city(x))⸣ is a logical consequence of 
⸢"x(city(x)↔𝜙*(x))⸣. In other words, it proves that (C) is a logical consequence of 
(T''). Given (D7), (T'') is a micro-reduction truth under a particular interpretation.25 
Since (C) is a logical consequence of a micro-reduction truth, (C) is a necessary truth. 
 
 (C) Every C0 is a city. 
 A logical form of (C): ⸢"x(C0(x)→city(x))⸣. 
(T) "x(city(x)↔𝜙x). 
 (T'') ⸢"x[city(x)↔C0(x) Ú 𝜙1(x) Ú 𝜙2(x) Ú 𝜙3(x) Ú 𝜙4(x) Ú 𝜙5(x) Ú… 𝜙n(x)]⸣ 
 
 This is Sider’s analysis of the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. Now we finish 
this chapter by recapitulating what we have done so far. In section 1.1, I have outlined 
Sider’s account of necessity in general. In section 1.2, I have explicated his analysis 
of the necessity of a micro-reduction truth and identified three technical terms for 
further explanations. In section 1.3-4, I have clarified each of these technical terms. In 
section 1.5, I have reconstructed Sider’s analysis and showed how it accounts for the 
necessity of a micro-reduction truth. 
 
                                               
25 More specifically, (C) is a logical consequence of (T) since (T) is a shorthand for (T''). As just 
mentioned, (T) is of a sentence of the form ⸢"x(Fx↔𝜙x)⸣ under a particular interpretation of ‘F’ and 
‘𝜙’. Hence, (T) is a micro-reduction truth under a particular interpretation of ‘F’ and ‘𝜙’. 
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CHAPTER 2  SCHAFFER’S MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY PROBLEM 
 
 
This chapter introduces the multiple realizability problem. In section 2.1, I present a 
schematic argument to illustrate the multiple realizability problem of Schaffer. In 
section 2.2-2.5, I articulate each of the premises in the argument and how they reach 
to the conclusion that Sider’s metaphysical semantics cannot handle multiple 
realizability. In section 2.6, I consider an impact on Sider’s analysis of the necessity of 
a micro-reduction truth. 
 
 
1. A Schematic Argument 
In his “Metaphysical Semantics Meets Multiple Realizability” (2013), Jonathan 
Schaffer poses a deeply challenging objection to Sider’s metaphysical semantics. In 
his article, Schaffer argues that Sider’s metaphysical semantics cannot handle multiply 
realizable non-fundamental truths. To put it more carefully, let us standardize 
Schaffer’s objection into the following schematic argument: 
 
1. There are multiply realizable non-fundamental truths. 
 
2. There are three conditions of adequacy for Sider’s metaphysical semantics. 
 
3. If there are multiple realizable non-fundamental truths, Sider’s metaphysical 
semantics cannot satisfy the three conditions of adequacy. 
------------------------------------------- 
4. Therefore, Sider’s metaphysical semantics cannot handle multiply realizable 
non-fundamental truths. 
 
This schematic argument illustrates the multiple realizability problem of Schaffer. In 






2. Multiple Realizability 
There are multiply realizable non-fundamental truths. For example, the truth that 
Moore has hands is obviously one of them. Such a non-fundamental truth is multiply 
realizable since its truth can hold in virtue of many different fundamental bases.26 Let 
us define a multiply realizable non-fundamental truth as follows: 
 
(R) T is a multiply realizable non-fundamental truth iff i) T is non-fundamental, 
ii) T is true, and iii) T can hold in virtue of many different actual and non-actual 
fundamental bases. 
 
Here, we will follow Sider’s proposed standard of fundamentality stated in section 1.3. 
Consider the truth that Moore has hands. Such a truth is a non-fundamental truth since 
it contains a non-fundamental term ‘hand’. The fundamental base of our world could 
be any sort of distributions of fields, permutations and combinations of particles, 
variations of physical principles, or whatever. Suppose that the actual fundamental 
base of our world is field-theoretic physics. Thus, it is actually the case that the truth 
that Moore has hands holds in virtue of field-theoretic physics. Presumably, it could 
have been the case that such a truth can hold in virtue of particle-theoretic physics, 
other than field-theoretic physics. Even more improbably, it could have been the case 
that such a truth can hold in virtue of an alien science where the fundamental physical 
properties are alien properties other than being mass, charge, spin, and so forth. Thus 
understood, non-fundamental truths ‘Moore has hands’, ‘Vienna is a city’, etc., are all 
multiply realizable because its truths can hold in virtue of many different actual and 
non-actual fundamental bases. Thus, premise 1 is validated. There are multiply 
realizable non-fundamental truths.  
 Schaffer offers an analogy. Given that multiple realizability poses a serious 
problem for reductive physicalism in philosophy of mind, so it also poses a similar 
problem for Sider’s metaphysical semantics. Just as reductive physicalism cannot 
                                               
26 In this thesis, I am neutral on the disputes over the connection between the fundamental and the non-
fundamental. So, it would be better to use ‘hold in virtue of’, rather than the notion of grounding, the 
notion of a metaphysical semantics, and so on. 
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identify a multiple realizable state “pain” with a specific physical state, Sider’s 
metaphysical semantics cannot identify a multiple realizable non-fundamental truth 
with a specific fundamental truth. Of course, this analogy is just for a heuristic purpose. 
The basic idea of it is to show that there might be something wrong with this one-one 
identity view of the connection between the fundamental and the non-fundamental. 
 
 
3. The Three Conditions of Adequacy 
Let us examine premise 2. There are three conditions of adequacy for Sider’s 
metaphysical semantics. As mentioned earlier, a metaphysical semantics of a language 
begins by stipulating a number of axioms that assign meanings to each of the lexical 
items in that language, yielding T-theorems of the form: 
 
 A sentence S of L is true in L iff 𝜙. 
 
Schaffer (2013, 738) claims that Sider’s metaphysical semantics must satisfy at least 
three conditions of adequacy. Here, let us understand ‘conditions of adequacy’ as 
constraints on Sider’s metaphysical semantics. (Recall our suggested definition of 
Sider’s metaphysical semantics in section 1.3. This makes a similar point.) Let us 
examine the three conditions of adequacy suggested by Schaffer. 
 The first condition of adequacy is Fitting. It says that 𝜙 in Sider’s metaphysical 
semantics must fit with intuitively correct usage in every conceivable circumstance. 
 
Fitting: The biconditionals must fit with intuitive usage by holding in [all] 
conceivable circumstances. (Schaffer 2013, 739 my amendment) 
 
Sider’s metaphysical semantics must obey Fitting. After all, to specify the semantic 
connection between S and 𝜙 in the T-theorems is the ambition of Sider’s metaphysical 
semantics. As Sider claims, “metaphysical semantics is more ambitious in that by 
giving meanings in fundamental terms, it seeks to achieve something not sought by 
linguistic semantics: to show how what we say [in non-fundamental language] fit into 
fundamental reality” (Sider 2011, 112 my emphasis). Sider’s metaphysical semantics 
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must be able to give meanings to each sentence of non-fundamental language in 
fundamental language and it must match with intuitively correct usage of what we say 
in non-fundamental language in every conceivable circumstance. 
 (Two complications here. First, there is an uncertainty as to how much fit with 
intuitive usage Sider’s metaphysical semantics requires. Sider contends that since his 
metaphysical semantics is just a toy model, it allows some imperfect matches with 
intuitive usage. We should not expect a toy metaphysical semantics to match with 
intuitively correct usage in every possible world or conceivable circumstance. He 
argues:  
 
“A more reasonable goal is the construction of “toy” metaphysical truth-
conditions. These will be toy in at least two ways, First, they needn’t match with 
intuitively correct usage in absolutely all possible worlds or conceivable 
circumstances. The mesh need only be approximate (the more mesh, the better)” 
(Sider 2011, 118). 
 
But how much mismatch can be tolerated by a toy metaphysical semantics? 
Unfortunately, Sider made no mention of this. Second, there is an unresolved debate 
over whether Sider’s metaphysical semantics requires to obey Fitting. He himself 
denies it. 
 
“The multiple realizability problem [of Schaffer] is generated by the assumption 
that metaphysical truth-conditions must obey a principle of ‘Fitting’, as Schaffer 
calls it—that they ‘must fit with intuitive usage by holding in most conceivable 
circumstances’. […] But I don’t think that Fitting is required by my theory of 
metaphysical truth-conditions itself.” (Sider 2013e, 768) 
 
But one thing for sure is that Sider contends that there is a real and non-toy 
metaphysical semantics. “What is the point of toy metaphysical truth-conditions? One 
point is to convince us that real, non-toy metaphysical truth-conditions exist” (Sider 
2011, 117). Given this, we are thereby reasonable to expect that a real and non-toy 
metaphysical semantics must perfectly fit with intuitively correct usage in every 
conceivable circumstance. Therefore, a real and non-toy metaphysical semantics must 
obey Fitting. Imperfect match is only for a toy metaphysical semantics. Even so, we 
should also expect that a toy metaphysical semantics must fit with intuitively correct 
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usage as much as possible. But Sider owes us an explanation of how much mismatch 
can be tolerated by a toy metaphysical semantics.) 
 The second condition of adequacy is Sparse. It says that 𝜙 in Sider’s metaphysical 
semantics must be phrased in purely fundamental terms. 
 
Sparse: The right bijunct must connect to the fundamental by being cast in purely 
fundamental terms. (Schaffer 2013, 739) 
 
This constraint is plainly obvious. As Sider puts it, “[t]he requirement that meanings 
are ‘given’ in purely joint-carving terms amounts to the requirement that 𝜙 be phrased 
in purely joint-carving terms” (2011, 113). Although Sider’s metaphysical semantics 
take a linguistic approach, it per se is a metaphysical account of the connection 
between the fundamental and the non-fundamental. After all, the goal of Sider’s 
metaphysical semantics is to give meanings to each sentence of non-fundamental 
language in fundamental language. 
 The third condition of adequacy is Explanatory. It says that Sider’s metaphysical 
semantics must explain our linguistic phenomena. 
 
Explanatory: The biconditionals must explain our linguistic behaviour. (Schaffer 
2013, 739) 
 
This constraint is also indisputable. To restate, Sider’s metaphysical semantics is an 
explanatory theory of the connection between the fundamental and the non-
fundamental. Sider (2011, 114) says that “a metaphysical semantics must successfully 
explain the linguistic behavior of the population in question”. Thus, Sider’s 
metaphysical semantics must obey Explanatory. 
 Putting all together: there are three conditions of adequacy for Sider’s 
metaphysical semantics. They are Fitting, Sparse and Explanatory. Although there will 
and must be a controversy over the three conditions of adequacy, let us assume that 
the triple constraints are plausibly correct, and that they are essential ingredients of 
Sider’s metaphysical semantics. 27  Hence, premise 2 is justified. There are three 
                                               
27 As we can see, Sider (2011, 116-117; 2013e, 768-769) rejects the principle of Fitting. 
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conditions of adequacy for Sider’s metaphysical semantics. 
 
4. Sider’s Metaphysical Semantics Meets Multiple Realizability 
Having articulated premise 1 and 2, let us examine premise 3. Here we shall consider 
whether Sider’s metaphysical semantics can satisfy the three conditions of adequacy 
Fitting, Sparse and Explanatory, when it meets multiply realizable non-fundamental 
truths. So far, we agree that there are multiply realizable non-fundamental truths, like 
the truth that Moore has hands. We also agree that there are three conditions of 
adequacy for Sider’s metaphysical semantics. So far so good. Now, we will see 
whether or not Sider’s metaphysical semantics is compatible with multiple realizability. 
 For the sake of argument, let us assume that there is a metaphysical semantics for 
the multiple realizable non-fundamental truth that Moore has hands. A true 
metaphysical semantics of English will yield a theorem of the form: 
 
T-theorem M: ‘Moore has hands’ is true in English iff 𝜙. 
 
Fitting requires that T-theorem M must fit with intuitively correct usage of what we 
say by ‘Moore has hands’ in English in every conceivable circumstance. Sparse 
requires that 𝜙 in T-theorem M must be written in purely fundamental terms. 
Exploratory requires that T-theorem M must explain our linguistic behavior. Does T-
theorem M satisfy the triple constraints? Schaffer argues that T-theorem M fails to do 
so. To show this, he asks the following question:  
 
Question: “What goes in for 𝜙 in the right bijunct of [T-theorem M] when there 
is multiple realizability” (Schaffer 2013, 741)?  
 
What and how exactly can Sider’s metaphysical semantics answer to Question? Sider 
(2011, 118-121) gives a few examples to show how his metaphysical semantics can 
give a meaning to the sentence ‘There exists an atom of hydrogen’. However, Schaffer 
argues that it is unclear how Sider’s metaphysical semantics can give a meaning for 
the multiply realizable non-fundamental truth that Moore has hands. Natural-kind 
terms such as hydrogen can only be realized by the actual fundamental base of the 
 
37 
world. Clearly, Sider’s metaphysical semantics has no problem with this. But the truth 
that Moore has hands is another story. Although it is perfectly fine to say that the 
meaning of ‘There exists an atom of hydrogen’ is ‘There exist an electron and a proton 
bonded to each other’, it is highly problematic that the meaning of ‘Moore has hands’ 
is ‘The subatomic particles of Moore’s hands have such-and-such masses and charges 
and spins in such-and-such spatial arrangements’. Moore could have hands if our 
world is fundamentally field-theoretic physics. Or Moore could have hands if our 
world is fundamentally particle-theoretic physics but the subatomic particles has some 
other fundamental properties rather than mass, charge and spin. Or Moore could have 
hands if our world is fundamentally … And so forth. In fact, the truth that Moore has 
hands can be multiply realized via any conceivable circumstance where things might 
fundamentally be. This is the multiple realizability problem and Sider’s metaphysical 
semantics is supposed to accommodate this kind of multiple realizability. 
 For Schaffer, he (2013, 741) claims that there is no answer to Question that can 
satisfy the triple conditions of adequacy: Fitting, Sparse and Explanatory. To defend 
this claim, he considers three possible answers to Question that Sider’s metaphysical 
semanticists might take to handle multiple realizability, and then shows that none of 




5. Three Possible Answers 
Now, we will consider the three possible answer to Question suggested by Schaffer. 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the actual fundamental base of our world 
is field-theoretic physics. The first suggested answer is that 𝜙 in T-theorem M is 
phrased by the actual fundamental base, namely field-theoretic physics. The second 
suggested answer is that 𝜙 in T-theorem M is phrased by a disjunction of physically 
possible bases of our actual field-theoretic physics, where a physically possible base 
is one that is compatible with the true physical laws. In this case, 𝜙 in T-theorem M 
would be a relatively long disjunction of various physically possible distributions of 
field. The third suggested answer is that 𝜙 is T-theorem M is phrased by a disjunction 
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of all possible fundamental bases. In this case, 𝜙 in T-theorem M would be an open-
ended infinitary disjunction of not only the actual fundamental base, but also the 
physically possible bases of our actual field-theoretic physics, plus anything that could 
be the fundamental base of our world, no matter how alien and inconceivable it sounds 
like. Things like God’s arrangement, Cartesian evil demon, Nozick’s experience 
machine, the mind of Berkeley’s deity, etc., could be the fundamental base of our world 
and should be included in the infinitely open-ended disjunction. Schaffer suggests that 
these are the three possible answers to Question that Sider’s metaphysical semantics 
might take to handle multiple realizability.28 Next, let us closely examine each of them 
and see whether they can satisfy the triple conditions of adequacy. 
 
The First Answer: Actual Realizer 
Schaffer suggests that the first answer that Sider’s metaphysical semantics may 
attempt to respond to the multiple realizability problem is to insert the actual 
fundamental base into 𝜙 in T-theorem M as follows. 
 
T-theorem M1: ‘Moore has hands’ is true in English iff the actual field-theoretic 
physics is such and such. 
 
Suppose again that our world is fundamentally field-theoretic. The right bijunct of T-
theorem M1 is filled in the highly complex details of actual field-theoretic physics that 
actually realize the truth that Moore has hands. 
                                               
28 In addition to the three possible answers, Schaffer (2013, 742-743) considers a fourth answer that 
Sider might take to be his favored answer. This answer is divided into two steps. The first step is to 
quantify over role properties of being a hand. In this case, T-theorem M would be written as follows: 
 
T-theorem MR: ‘Moore has hands’ is true in English iff Moore has properties that play the hands 
role. (Schaffer 2013, 742) 
 
Next, the fourth answer proceeds to the second step. Since ‘properties that play the hands role’ in the 
right bijunct of T-theorem MR is plainly a non-fundamental term by the proposed standard of Sider’s 
fundamentality. So the second step is to give a metaphysical semantics to such a non-fundamental term. 
 
T-theorem MR2: ‘Moore has properties that play the hands role’ is true in English iff 𝜙. 
 
Schaffer argues that the multiple realizability problem reappears. The truth that Moore has properties 




 Let us evaluate the first answer. It satisfies Sparse but does not satisfy Fitting and 
Explanatory. The first answer satisfies Sparse since the right bijunct of T-theorem M1 
is written in purely fundamental field-theoretic expressions. Recall that we suppose 
that our world is fundamentally field-theoretic physics. Unfortunately, the first answer 
fails to satisfy Fitting. It requires that T-theorem M1 must fit with intuitive usage by 
holding in every conceivable circumstance. Clearly, T-theorem M1 makes ‘Moore has 
hands’ in English come out false in a circumstance where the fundamental base of our 
world is particle-theoretic physics. In fact, any conceivable circumstance where a 
slightly different distribution of fields in physics other than the actual one would 
suffice to prove that T-theorem M1 fails to obey Fitting. Moreover, there are 
countlessly many and various conceivable ways things might fundamentally be. The 
actual realizer of the non-fundamental truth that Moore has hands is just one of the 
many. This is exactly the multiple realizability problem.  
 The first answer does not satisfy Explanatory either. Schaffer (2013, 744) writes 
that “[T-theorem M1] does not explain what we say since it is overly specific, includes 
irrelevant details, and misses the generalizations.” He then goes on to explain what an 
apt explanation for non-fundamental truths is like. For him, “[a]n apt explanation for 
why English speakers say ‘Moore has hands’ involves something like the presence of 
hands. This is an apt level of explanation, with the appropriate specificity, relevance 
of information and amenability to generalization” (2013, 744). Here, I agree with 
Schaffer. For the reasons he gives are cogent and legitimate.  
 In addition, there is another reason to think T-theorem M1 is not an apt 
explanation for our linguistic behavior. For it is unclear to me exactly what Sider’s 
metaphysical semantics tries to explain. I am not sure that I fully understand what 
Sider takes to be his conception of “meaning” in his metaphysical semantics. After all, 
his metaphysical semantics is a metaphysical kind of semantic theory that gives 
‘meanings’ to every sentence of non-fundamental language in fundamental language. 
But he claims that the explanatory goal of his metaphysical semantics differs from 
those of theories of meaning. So he writes: 
 
“[T]he explanatory goals differ from those of linguistic semantics. In one way 
they are more ambitious, and in another, more modest. Metaphysical semantics 
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is more ambitious in that by giving meanings in fundamental terms, it seeks to 
achieve something not sought by linguistic semantics: to show how what we say 
fts into fundamental reality. Metaphysical semantics is more modest in that it tries 
to explain a narrower range of phenomena. […] According to a traditional 
conception (largely associated with Frege), meaning plays a broad theoretical role: 
the meaning of a sentence is conventionally encoded by that sentence, grasped by 
anyone who understands the sentence, is communicated when the sentence is 
used; sentence-meanings are the objects of thought and other propositional 
attitudes, and so on.” (2011, 112) 
 
From Sider’s quotation, we can see explicitly that his metaphysical semantics does not 
associate with the traditional conception of meaning and so does not take it to be 
propositional attitudes, objects of thought, states of affairs, etc. This suggests that there 
is an obscurity of what he takes to be his conception of ‘meaning’ in his metaphysical 
semantics. Since Sider’s metaphysical semantics is not integrated with the traditional 
conception of meaning, it is permissible to go beyond the understanding of competent 
speakers when it assigns a certain ‘meaning’ to a given sentence of non-fundamental 
language in purely fundamental language. He claims: 
 
But she [a metaphysical semanticist] is not concerned to integrate her semantics 
with other linguistic or psychological theories. Thus she is not trying to integrate 
her semantics with syntactic theory, for example. And she is free to assign 
semantic values that competent speakers would be incapable of recognizing as 
such, for she is not trying to explain what a competent speaker knows when she 
understands her language. She might, for example, assign to an ordinary sentence 
about ordinary macroscopic objects a meaning that makes reference to the 
fundamental physical states of subatomic particles. And she might simply ignore 
Frege’s (1952/1892) puzzle of the cognitive nonequivalence of co-referring 
proper names, since she is not trying to integrate her semantics with theories of 
action and rationality. (2011, 113 my emphasis) 
 
Given the special feature of Sider’s conception of meaning, I find this difficult to 
understand exactly what Sider’s metaphysical semantics tries to explain. It seems to 
me that there is an inevitable tension between its ‘metaphysical character’ and 
‘semantic character’ of his metaphysical semantics. In order to do the metaphysical 
works, his metaphysical semantics must hold an innovative and unfamiliar conception 
of meaning differing from a theory of meaning. If it makes no difference from the 
traditional one, what makes it so special and metaphysical? After all, one of the 
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metaphysical ambitions of his metaphysical semantics is to account for the connection 
between the fundamental and the non-fundamental. But in order to do the semantic 
works, his metaphysical semantics, like any theory of meaning, must in some sense 
follow the traditional and orthodox conception of meaning to explain what we say in 
non-fundamental language. Otherwise, it cannot be a declared semantic and 
explanatory theory. As I take it, this underlying tension is the main obstacle to apt 
explanations for our linguistic phenomena. 
 To conclude, even though the first answer satisfies Sparse, it does not satisfy 
Fitting and Explanatory.  
 
The Second Answer: Potential Actual Realizers 
Next, Schaffer considers the second answer that Sider’s metaphysical semantics might 
take to handle the multiple realizability problem. This answer inserts the actual 
fundamental base—field-theoretic physics, plus all physically possible bases of our 
actual field-theoretic physics into 𝜙 in T-theorem M as follows. 
 
T-theorem M2: ‘Moore has hands’ is true in English iff the actual field-theoretic 
physics is such and such, or a physically possible distribution of field is such and 
such, or… 
 
Suppose again that the actual fundamental story of our world is field-theoretic. The 
right bijunct of T-theorem M2 is filled in a relatively long disjunction of various 
physically possible distributions of field that could realize the truth that Moore has 
hands. 
 Let us evaluate the second answer. Schaffer claims that it is indeterminate as to 
whether T-theorem M2 satisfies Sparse. It is indeterminate precisely because T-
theorem M2 contains a disjunction in the right bijunct. Sider (2011, 216-219) argues 
for the claim that disjunction is a fundamental term. But this claim is a controversial 
claim and not every philosopher endorses this. Since we need not go into detail about 
his argument for fundamental logical connectives, let us assume that the second answer 
satisfies Sparse. Even so, it satisfies neither Fitting nor Explanatory for the same 
reasons as the first answer. In terms of Fitting, T-theorem M2 makes a little progress 
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in capturing with intuitively correct usage in every conceivable circumstance. But that 
is clearly not enough, since T-theorem M2 makes ‘Moore has hands’ in English come 
out false in any circumstance where the fundamental base of our world is outside of 
the disjunction containing in T-theorem M2. For example, the fundamental base could 
be the mind of Berkeley’s deity, but clearly the disjunction under consideration does 
not cover this. For Explanatory, again, T-theorem M2 is still not an apt explanation for 
‘Moore has hands’ because of its inappropriate specificity and irrelevant information 
and failure in generalization. Just as the first answer, it is still unclear to me what T-
theorem M2 tries to explain. 
 To conclude, the second answer satisfies Sparse, but it fails to obey Fitting and 
Explanatory. 
 
The Third Answer: Possible Realizers 
Finally, Schaffer considers the third answer that Sider’s metaphysical semantics might 
take to escape from the multiple realizability problem. For this answer, it inserts all 
possible fundamental bases into 𝜙 in T-theorem M as follows. 
 
T-theorem M3: ‘Moore has hands’ is true in English iff the actual field-theoretic 
physics is such and such, or a physically possible distribution of field is such and 
such, or a particle-theoretic physics is such and such, or God’s arrangement is 
such and such, or Cartesian evil demon is such and such, or Nozick’s experience 
machine is such and such, or the mind of Berkeley’s deity is such and such, or … 
 
Continue to suppose that the fundamental story of our world is field-theoretic. The 
right bijunct of T-theorem M3 is filled in an infinitely open-ended disjunction of the 
actual field-theoretic physics, all physically possible bases of our actual field-theoretic 
physics, particle-theoretic physics, other merely possible fundamental bases, etc., that 
could possibly realize the truth that Moore has hands. 
 Let us evaluate the third answer. Finally, T-theorem M3 satisfies Fitting since it 
captures intuitively correct usage in every conceivable circumstance of both actual and 
possible fundamental bases. However, T-theorem M3 fails to obey Sparse and 
Explanatory. With respect to Sparse, the infinitely open-ended disjunction contained 
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in T-theorem M3 violates the use of fundamental terms. Recall that we assume that our 
world is fundamentally physical (actual physics), whether physics is field-theoretic or 
particle-theoretic. But when T-theorem M3 contains such a disjunction, the terms of 
God’s arrangement, Cartesian evil demon, Berkeley’s deity or whatever are clearly 
non-fundamental terms. This plainly violates the requirement of Sparse. As to 
Explanatory, T-theorem M3 is still far away from being an apt explanation for ‘Moore 
has hands’. For the infinitely open-ended disjunction of T-theorem M3 remains full of 
overly specific and irrelevant details about what fundamentally realizes the truth that 
Moore has hands. Indeed, it is highly questionable whether such a disjunction has 
anything to do in explaining what we say by ‘Moore has hands’ in English. 
 To conclude, the third answer satisfies Fitting, but it fails to obey Sparse and 
Explanatory. 
 
Putting all together: the above considerations show that none of the three suggested 
answers can satisfy more than one of the three conditions of adequacy. For the first 
and second answers, they satisfy Sparse but fails to obey Fitting and Explanatory. For 
the third answer, it satisfies Fitting but fails to obey Sparse and Explanatory. Thus, 
premise 3 is proved. If there are multiple realizable non-fundamental truths, Sider’s 
metaphysical semantics cannot satisfy the three conditions of adequacy 
 
 
6. The Impact on Sider’s Analysis of the Necessity of a Micro-
reduction Truth 
Let us revisit the schematic argument outlined in the beginning of this chapter. The 
argument is as follows: 
 
1. There are multiply realizable non-fundamental truths. 
 
2. There are three conditions of adequacy for Sider’s metaphysical semantics. 
 
3. If there are multiple realizable non-fundamental truths, Sider’s metaphysical 
 
44 
semantics cannot satisfy the three conditions of adequacy 
------------------------------------------- 
4. Therefore, Sider’s metaphysical semantics cannot handle multiply realizable 
non-fundamental truths. 
 
Now, we are in the position to fully understand the argument. Let me summarize how 
Schaffer proves premises 1-3. He proves premise 1 by showing that there are multiply 
realizable non-fundamental truths. For instance, the truth that Moore has hands is of 
such a truth. To prove premise 2, he demonstrates that there are three conditions of 
adequacy for Sider’s metaphysical semantics: Fitting, Sparse and Explanatory. He 
proves premise 3 by considering three possible answers that Sider’s metaphysical 
semantics might take to respond to the multiple realizability problem and showing that 
none of them can satisfy more than one of the triple conditions of adequacy. Therefore, 
he concludes that Sider’s metaphysical semantics cannot handle multiply realizable 
non-fundamental truths. This is the overall picture of Schaffer’s multiple realizability 
problem. 
 In his “Reply to Jonathan Schaffer” (2013), Sider attempts to defend a fourth 
answer to Question in response to the multiple realizability problem. His attempted 
defence is constitutive of several tentative proposals, presuppositions and highly 
sophisticated arguments. For present purposes, we will not examine it and leave aside 
the question as to whether it succeeds in refuting the problem. At any rate, we need 
not make any conclusion for this. This is an important issue for proponents of Sider’s 
metaphysical semantics. What is important to us instead concerns the fact that Sider 
admits that there is something wrong with his analysis of the necessity of a micro-
reduction truth and the matter demands a modification of it. Sider writes: 
 
“Though each of these retreats is possible, I myself prefer a different one. I want 
to argue that the multiple realizability problem [of Schaffer] is primarily a 
problem for my account of modality, and not for my account of metaphysical 
truth-conditions per se, and thus that it can be solved by modifying my theory of 
modality (though I will not here attempt this modification).” 
 
“The multiple realizability problem [of Schaffer] is generated by the assumption 
that metaphysical truth-conditions must obey a principle of ‘Fitting’, as Schaffer 
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calls it—that they ‘must fit with intuitive usage by holding in most conceivable 
circumstances’. Now, something like Fitting is most certainly implied by my 
Humean theory of necessity: I say that the ‘axioms’ of a theory of metaphysical 
truth-conditions are ipso facto necessarily true (section 12.9) (and it’s likely that 
the metaphysical truth-conditions we have been discussing would count as 
axioms). But I don’t think that Fitting is required by my theory of metaphysical 
truth-conditions itself.” (Sider 2013e, 768) 
 
I will take the quotation of Sider to be a friendly invitation or an important motivational 
factor to propose a modified analysis of the necessity of a micro-reduction. For this 
reason, I will in the next chapter propose a modified version of Sider’s reductive 
account of necessity to explain the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. 
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CHAPTER 3  A MODIFIED ACCOUNT OF NECESSITY 
 
 
This chapter proposes and defends a modified account of necessity. In section 3.1, I 
develop a modified version of Sider’s account of necessity. In section 3.2 and 3.3, I 
define the notion of ‘express’ in terms of Grice’s theory of meaning and Lewis’s 
reference magnetism. In section 3.4 and 3.5, I revisit my modified account and present 
a new reductive analysis of the necessity of a micro-reduction truth as well as an 
analytic truth and a natural-kind truth. In section 3.6, I consider a potential objection 
to my modified account and attempt to reply it. 
 
 
1. A Modified Account 
As we have seen in chapter 2, the multiple realizability problem of Schaffer seriously 
threatens the credibility of Sider’s analysis of the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. 
More importantly, Sider admits that a revision of his account of necessity is needed to 
be done. In this chapter, I propose and defend a modified analysis of the necessity of 
a micro-reduction truth. I show that my proposed analysis can define the notion of a 
micro-reduction truth without appeal to Sider’s metaphysical semantics. I then argue 
that analytic, natural-kind and micro-reduction truths are necessary iff they express the 
same states of affairs as logical truths. Since logical truths are necessary truths, analytic, 
natural-kind and micro-reduction truths are necessary truths as well. To begin with, let 
me present my proposed account as follows: 
 
(*) A non-modal qualitative sentence S in a language L is a de dicto necessary 
truth iff S is a non-modal qualitative, de dicto and true sentence such that 
 
(1) There is a state of affairs 𝜙 such that i) S in L expresses 𝜙 and ii) for some 
sentence S* in some language of predicate logic L* and for some interpretation 
I*, S* in L* expresses 𝜙 under I*, and 
 
(2) S* in L* is a logical consequence of the set of mathematical truths in L* under 
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I* and metaphysical laws in L* under I*. 
 
Frist, let us restrict my modified account to an account of de dicto necessity and leave 
de re necessity aside.29 Let us also restrict my modified account to an account that 
applies only to non-modal qualitative sentences. A qualitative sentence is a sentence 
that expresses a qualitative state of affairs. A qualitative state of affairs is a state of 
affairs that does not concern any particular entity. Possible examples of a qualitative 
state of affairs are: the state of affairs that there is a cube, and the state of affairs that 
every emerald is green. Possible examples of a non-qualitative state of affairs are: the 
state of affairs that Trump is an American, and the state of affairs that Plato is the 
teacher of Aristotle. Roughly speaking, a qualitative sentence is a sentence that does 
not contain any name or concern any particular entity. 
 Second, let us suppose that there is a language of predicate logic L* and an 
interpretation I* that maps each predicate to a perfectly natural property or relation. 
Suppose also that L* contains enough predicates and names such that i) for every 
object O, I* maps a name in L* to O, and ii) for every property or relation P, I* maps 
a predicate in L* to P. Thus understood, L* under the interpretation I* is a language 
that is closely skin to Sider’s fundamental language.  
 To explain (2), I shall define mathematical truths in L* under I* and metaphysical 
laws in L* under I*. A mathematical truth 𝜓* in L* under I* expresses a mathematical 
truth 𝜓 in a language L iff i) 𝜓 is a mathematical truth in L, and ii) 𝜓* under I* 
expresses the same state of affairs as 𝜓 in L. Here, let us take L to be a language whose 
vocabularies consist of mathematical, English and set-theoretic expressions. A 
metaphysical law 𝜒* in L* under I* expresses a metaphysical law 𝜒 in English iff i) 𝜒 
is a metaphysical law in English, and ii) 𝜒* under I* expresses the same state of affairs 
as 𝜒 in English. The notion of ‘expressing’ here is understood as an interpretation 
function in a logician sense. But let us postpone our explanation of this idea until 
section 3.4. I will assume that mathematical truths are necessary on their own and there 
is no further feature to explain their necessity. We can understand a mathematical truth 
in L as a sentence in L that is true and concerns only mathematics. 
                                               
29 Unfortunately, this thesis cannot offer a non-circular account of de re necessity. 
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 In regard to the notion of a metaphysical law, I will appeal to Sider’s approach to 
metaphysical laws. His approach to laws of metaphysics is similar to Lewis’s approach 
to laws of nature. 30  Sider’s definition of a metaphysical law is presumably the 
following: 
 
(ML) A sentence S is a metaphysical law iff S is a regularity in the best system, 
where a best system is a deductive system that achieves the best combination of 
simplicity and strength. 
 
The best combination of simplicity and strength is an important matter. If complexity 
is cheap, then special-science regularities counts as laws. If complexity is expensive, 
then only laws of logic count as laws. (Sider also defines the notion of a logical truth 
by appeal to Lewis’s account of lawhood.31 Recall section 1.1.) If complexity is made 
somewhere in between special-science regularities and laws of logic, then laws of 
physics count as laws. The central claim of his approach to metaphysical laws: if a cost 
of complexity is made intermediate between laws of logic and laws of physics, then 
laws of metaphysics count as laws and laws of physics drop out. This is Sider’s 
approach to metaphysical laws. Here, I will follow Sider and borrow his approach to 
be my definition of a metaphysical law in L. 
 For the notion of a logical consequence, let us assume a model-theoretical account 
of a logical consequence, according to which a sentence S is a logical consequence of 
a set of sentences K1,K2,…Kn iff there is no model in which K1,K2,…Kn are true and S 
is false. 
 Claim (*) is the core claim of this thesis. To articulate (1), I shall begin by 
articulating what I mean by “state of affairs” and “express” in i). First, let me sketch 
my use of the term ‘state of affairs’. A state of affairs is a way things are or a way 
things are not.32 They are not literally true or false, but obtaining or not obtaining. 
Following Pollock (1984, 54), I will interpret obtaining and not obtaining as “truth-
like properties”. Prima facie, the state of affairs that Mark Twain is the author of 
                                               
30 See Lewis (1973; 1983; 1986; 1994), and Sider (2011 sections 3.1; 12.5). 
31 See Sider (2011, section 10.3). 
32 Again, I am indebted to Dan Marshall for this suggestion. 
 
49 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn obtains iff it is true that Mark Twain is the author of 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Likewise, the state of affairs that some koalas are 
poached eggs does not obtain iff it is false that some koalas are poached eggs. Let the 
term ‘states of affairs’ be understood as stated. 
 Second, let us understand ‘express’ as a semantic notion. Here, I assume that the 
‘expressing’ relation between sentences and states of affairs is a semantic relation. To 
avoid circularity, I reject the ‘expressing’ relation to be modally understood. If one 
does not share the assumption of mine, then there is an alternative approach to take. 
For example, one could take ‘express’ as a primitive notion and gives examples to 
explain (*). Presumably, this approach causes a problem of ideological extravagance. 
In addition, it seems to me that meaning is not fundamental. Given these reasons, I 
shall explore two theories of meaning in the following two sections. 
 
 
2. Paul Grice’s Theory of Meaning 
We are now dealing with this question: in virtue of what do sentences come to have 
the meanings that they have. There are two major theories of meaning in respect to 
this: Paul Grice’s (1957) theory of meaning and David Lewis’s (1984) reference 
magnetism. Let us examine the former first. 
 Grice makes a significant distinction between what sentences mean (sentence-
meaning) and what speakers mean by utterances (speaker-meaning). The idea is that 
sentence-meaning concerns with the standard, literal, and ordinary meaning of a given 
sentence, while speaker-meaning concerns with what speakers intend to convey to the 
hearers by uttering a given sentence. Grice’s distinction is a nice explanation for the 
cases of sarcasm and metaphor. Consider this situation. A philosophy student x invites 
his/her supervisor to write him/her a recommendation letter for the application of the 
graduate school. In the letter, the supervisor comments on his/her philosophical talent 
by writing this sentence:  
 
(A) Student x is an excellent basketball player. 
 
The sentence-meaning of (A) is the literal meaning that student x is an excellent 
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basketball player, while the speaker-meaning is what the supervisor wants to convey 
(B) to the readers. 
 
(B) Student x is not good in doing philosophy. 
 
Grice’s distinction shows that sentence-meaning and speaker-meaning are greatly 
different from each other. It is plain to see that the sentence literally means (A) while 
the speaker by uttering (A) actually means (B). 
 Furthermore, Grice’s account of meaning is a reductive account. On this view, the 
reduction contains two steps. First, sentence-meaning is explained in terms of speaker-
meaning. As we have just seen in our example, the sentence (A) is used by the 
supervisor to mean something else, namely (B). Second, speaker-meaning is further 
explained in terms of the intentions of the speakers. In the above case, what the 
supervisor means by writing down (A) is to intend i) that the readers come to believe 
in (B), ii) that the readers recognize the supervisor’s intention, and iii) that the readers 
come to believe in (B) on the basis of the recognition of the supervisor’s intention. 
Putting all together, sentence-meaning is ultimately defined in terms of the intentions 
of the speakers. 
 Let us say a bit more on the notion of speakers’ intention in Grice’s theory of 
meaning. Obviously, speakers’ intentions play an important role in explaining speaker-
meaning, but other mental states—beliefs, desires, recognitions, etc.—also do. How 
does Grice himself think of the nature of mental states? Unfortunately, there is no 
explicit statement in his (1957) article to show which views he really holds. Devitt and 
Sterelny (1999, 149) suggest that Grice tacitly endorses a behavioristic view of mental 
states, according to which mental states are identified with behavioral dispositions.33 
But this issue goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
                                               
33 See Grice (1957, 386-388). Grice remarks that there are linguistic and behavioral (non-linguistic in 
Grice own word) conventions for our intentions and actions. The linguistic convention nicely explains 
why an individual who asks for a pump at a fire does not mean a bicycle pump. The behavioral 
convention nicely explains why an individual who runs away from a bull wants to live. It is worth noting 
that Grice thinks that intention could be linguistic and behavioral. But what does “behavioral intention” 
mean? Prima facie, it just means “action”. The fact that Grice identifies intention with action explains 
the reason why he uses “intend” and “act” in pretty much the same way; See also Grandy and Warner 
(2017 sec 6) for Grice’s view of commonsense psychology. 
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 So far so good. Given Grice’s theory of meaning, we are in the position to define 
‘express’ in terms of Grice’s notion of speakers’ intentions. 
 
(3') A sentence S in a language L expresses a state of affairs 𝜙 iff S in L sentence-
means 𝜙. 
 
(3.1') A sentence S in L sentence-means 𝜙 iff S in L speaker-means 𝜙. 
 
(3.2') A sentence S in L speaker-means 𝜙 iff i) a speaker by uttering S is to intend 
that the hearers come to believe in 𝜙, ii) the hearers recognize the speaker’s 
intention, and iii) the hearers come to believe in 𝜙 on the basis of the recognition 
of the speaker’s intention. 
 
However, this attempted analysis does not sound attractive. To fully explain it, I will 
probably have to either take mental states (intentions, beliefs, desires, recognitions, 
etc.) to be primitive notions or offer a reductive explanation for mental states. The 
former option threats the ideological parsimony of my proposed account, while the 
latter option is a challenging task.34 The exact nature of mental states is a large project 
in philosophy of mind that I will not examine here. Either way, it seems to me that 
adopting Grice’s theory of meaning is not a preferable option. But if it is not suitable 
for my account, what else? It seems to me that Lewis’s reference magnetism is more 
                                               
34 Let us briefly consider what would happen if I adopt Grice’s theory and offer a reductive explanation 
for metal states. In this case, I think that certain doctrines in philosophy of mind must be ruled out so as 
to be consistent with the central claim of this thesis that modality is not fundamental. For example, I 
cannot hold analytical behaviourism, according to which mental states are behavioral dispositions. If I 
adopt Grice’s theory, then I will hold (1) and (2); if I hold behaviourism, then I will hold (3) as well. 
 
(1) Sentence-meaning =df Speaker-meaning 
(2) Speaker-meaning =df Mental state 
(3) Mental states =df Behavioral disposition 
 
However, this leads to an explanatory circuity. All I want to define overall is modality, but I end up 
analysing it in terms of disposition which itself is a modal notion. Disposition is generally accepted to 
be analysed in terms of counterfactual conditionals: an object x is disposed to y when s iff x would y if 
x is under the situation s. For example, salt is disposed to dissolve in water when it is put into water iff 
salt would dissolve in water if it is under the situation where it is put into water. So, I cannot hold 
behaviorism to explain the nature of metal states.  
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promising. Let us move on to the next section for a detailed survey of Lewis’s account. 
 
 
3. David Lewis’s Reference Magnetism 
An alternative approach to define ‘express’ is to adopt the notion of a correct 
interpretation of Lewis’s (1984) reference magnetism. Given reference magnetism, I 
propose the following analysis to define ‘express’. 
 
(3) A sentence S in a language L expresses a state of affairs 𝜙 iff for some 
interpretation I, I is a correct interpretation of L and S in L expresses 𝜙 under I. 
 
This definition sounds more promising. To understand (3), we have to understand the 
notion of a correct interpretation of Lewis’s reference magnetism. To introduce 
Lewis’s reference magnetism, I shall outline Putnam’s model-theoretic argument first. 
 In metasemantics, philosophers of language dispute over this problem: How do 
words get their meanings? To rephrase this, how do words refer to objects in the 
world?35 According to Putnam’s (1977; 1980; 1981 ch. 2) model-theoretic argument, 
there is no sufficient semantic determinacy to stick words onto their meanings. Putnam 
supports his argument by demonstrating that there are just too many ways in which 
assignments of meanings to words could be bizarrely made but our favored semantic 
theory can nevertheless be true. As a result, the semantic (referential) relations 
between words and meanings (objects in the world) are indeterminant. Although our 
linguistic conventions and behaviors are constraints on meaning-determination, they 
are largely dependent on our intentions or whatever mental-psychological states.36 
The semantic (referential) relations in question are still mind-dependent and thus 
indeterminant. Hence, Putnam’s argument stands. 
 Let us further illustrate Putnam’s argument. Consider our meaning-determining 
activity as a semantic theory T which consists of a set of sentences. Normally, T will 
                                               
35 In the debate between Lewis’s and Putnam’s, they prefer to use ‘referent’ of a word instead of 
‘meaning’ of a word. But it would be permissible to take them as synonymy. For our propose let us stick 
to ‘meaning’. 
36 Similarly, ‘meaning-determination’ and ‘reference-fixing’ are equivalent in meaning. 
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have more than one interpretation and each of them will map predicates and names 
onto objects in the world. The sort of mapping in question is to be understood as 
assignments of meanings. In each interpretation, meanings are assigned to each of the 
predicates and names of T. Now, the important question is: What is the best 
interpretation, or the correct interpretation? Putnam claims that the correct 
interpretation is the one that makes every sentence in T come out true.37 Thus, he 
contends that though T contains some intuitively false sentences, T would still be 
logically consistent. To see this, let (D) abbreviate ‘Some donkeys talk’. Undeniably, 
(D) is an intuitively false sentence. Nonetheless, we can arguably make (D) come out 
true in an interpretation by constructing a “deviant” interpretation where meanings are 
inappropriately assigned to words. For example, we can do it by assigning the set of 
birds to the predicate ‘donkey’ and the set of flying things to the predicate ‘talk’. Given 
such a deviant assignment, the extensions of ‘donkey’ and ‘talk’ overlap. This makes 
(D) come out true under the deviant interpretation since some birds fly. On Putnam’s 
view, there is nothing wrong with the deviant interpretation. At any rate, he probably 
does not think that such an interpretation is deviant at all. For him, all is required for 
an interpretation to be correct is merely that every sentence in T comes out true. 
However, we better say the deviant interpretation we have just made is incorrect. For 
we are pretty sure that such an interpretation by no means reflects what we really mean 
by ‘donkey’ and ‘talk’. There must be something more for an interpretation to be 
correct than merely making every sentence in T comes out true.38 
 In response to Putnam’s argument, Lewis’s (1984) reference magnetism comes 
on the scene. According to Lewis, Putnam’s argument can be refuted by adding an 
additional constraint on the notion of a correct interpretation. Instead of the constraint 
of making all sentences come out true, Lewis suggests that there is an eligibility 
constraint on the notion of a correct interpretation. On this view, a correct 
interpretation must assign as much as possible eligible meanings to predicates. More 
importantly, a correct interpretation must also maximize the sum of the degree of truth 
and the degree of eligibility, rather than doing the best of either one of them. The 
                                               
37 Here, let us ignore for a moment the distinction between uniqueness and non-uniqueness conceptions 
of ‘correct interpretation’. We will discuss it later. 
38 For a more comprehensive illustration of Putnam’s argument, see Putnam (1977; 1980; 1981 ch. 2), 
Lewis (1984), Sider (2001 sec. 2; 2011, 23-28) and Hale and Wright (1997). 
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following is a formulation of a correct interpretation of Lewis’s reference magnetism: 
 
(RM) An interpretation I is a correct interpretation of a language L as used by a 
person X or a population P iff I maximizes the sum of the degree of truth and the 
degree of eligibility. 
 
Before proceeding, I shall distinguish uniqueness and non-uniqueness conceptions of 
‘correct interpretation’.39 According to the uniqueness conception, there is one and 
only one correct interpretation—the correct interpretation. According to the non-
uniqueness conception, there are multiple correct interpretations. One advantage of the 
non-uniqueness conception is to handle cases of vagueness. For example, ‘Sam is bald’ 
will presumably have more than one correct interpretation. Since there is no clear-cut 
distinction between bald and not bald, there is no single correct interpretation of being 
bald or being not bald either. In general, the non-uniqueness conception is more 
realistic since natural languages are full of vague words. But things will get more 
complicated when it involves vagueness. So, the chief advantage of the uniqueness 
conception is simplicity. If one takes the uniqueness conception, (RM) should be 
amended into the following: 
 
(RM') An interpretation I is the correct interpretation of a language L as used by 
a person X or a population P iff I is the one that maximizes the sum of the degree 
of truth and the degree of eligibility. 
 
In this thesis, I will stand on the non-uniqueness side and take (RM) to be an official 
formulation of a correct interpretation of Lewis’s reference magnetism. But for 
simplicity, I will also assume that English has a unique correct interpretation. 
 
(1) Fit-with-use 
For an interpretation to be correct, it must make as much as possible sentences come 
out true. Lewis and Putnam both agree with this idea. But Lewis’s constraint on 
                                               
39  I am grateful to Dan Marshall for pointing out the distinction between uniqueness and non-
uniqueness conceptions of ‘correct interpretation’. 
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‘making sentences come out true’ is largely different from Putnam’s. It is argued that 
Putnam’s constraint is trivial and unrestricted. As Putnam’s argument showed, it is 
trivially easy to make the sentence ‘Some donkeys talk’ come out true under the 
deviant interpretation. On the contrary, Lewis’s constraint is non-trivial and restricted. 
To maximize the degree of truth, Lewis contends that a correct interpretation must 
assign meanings to words on the basis of the linguistic behaviors of a person or a 
population. In other words, a correct interpretation must fit with the linguistic use of a 
person or a population. Let us take (1a) to be a proper understanding of Lewis’s notion 
of fit-with-use. 
 
(1a): An interpretation I maximizes the degree of truth iff I fits with the linguistic 
use of a person X or a population P. 
 
On Lewis’s view, the linguistic behaviors and conventions play an important role in 
assigning meanings to words. Let us illustrate it by an example. Let (C) abbreviate 
‘Every cat is an animal’. Now, we make two interpretations for (C) where we assign 
different meanings to the predicate ‘cat’. 
 
 Interpretation 1 (I1): we assign the meaning being computer to the predicate ‘cat’. 
 
 Interpretation 2 (I2): we assign the meaning being cat to the predicate ‘cat’. 
 
According to the linguistic conventions of our population in an ordinary sense, it 
seems to be a brute fact that I1 does not reflect our use of (C). One way to think about 
it is that I1 makes (C) come out false under this interpretation. (C) under I1 is clearly 
false since the extensions of the set of computers and the set of animals do not overlap. 
Given this reason, we have a strong intuition to think that I2 is a correct interpretation 
for (C). Prima facie, let us understand Lewis’s notion fit-with-use as presented. (We 
will come up with a modified version of Lewis’s notion of fit-with-use in section 3.6.) 
 
(2) Eligibility 
The main thesis of Lewis’s reference magnetism is that meanings are not merely 
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determined by the linguistic conventions of us, but also by the objective nature of the 
world. As Lewis puts it, 
 
“Referring isn’t just something we do. What we say and think not only doesn’t 
settle what we refer to; it doesn’t even settle the prior question of how it is to be 
settled what we refer to. Meanings—as the saying goes—just ain’t in the head.” 
(1984, 226) 
 
“I am inclined to favour a different kind of constraint proposed by G. H. Merrill. 
[…] This constraint looks not to the speech and thought of those who refer, and 
not to their causal connections to the world, but rather to the referents themselves. 
Among all the countless things and classes that there are, most are miscellaneous, 
gerrymandered, ill-demarcated. Only an elite minority are carved at the joints, so 
that their boundaries are established by objective sameness and difference in 
nature. Only these elite things and classes are eligible to serve as referents. The 
world—any world—has the makings of many interpretations that satisfy many 
theories; but most of these interpretations are disqualified because they employ 
ineligible referents. When we limit ourselves to the eligible interpretations, the 
ones that respect the objective joints in nature, there is no longer any guarantee 
that (almost) any world can satisfy (almost) any theory. It becomes once again a 
worthy goal to discover a theory that will come true on an eligible interpretation, 
and it becomes a daring and risky hope that we are well on the way toward 
accomplishing this.” (1984, 227 my emphasis) 
 
Fit-with-use is just one of the determinant factors; the other factor is eligibility of 
meanings. Although there are multiple candidate meanings that are equally fitting-
with-use, one meaning is more eligible to serve as a meaning than others. In short, a 
meaning M is eligible iff M is the most natural/elite kind—the one that carves the 
nature at the joints. To fully explicate Lewis’s idea of eligibility, let us divide our 
explication into the notion of eligibility and the measurement of eligibility. 
 Let us talk about the notion of eligibility. Since Lewis interprets eligibility as 
naturalness, it would be permissible to think that natural properties are eligible 
meanings. Moreover, Lewis’s naturalness is best thought of as a matter of degree, and 
so does eligibility. The more natural a property is, the more eligible a meaning is. More 
carefully, the meaning of a predicate F is more eligible iff the property expressed by F 
is more natural. But then what exactly is the notion of a natural property? The 




“Sharing of [sparse properties] makes for qualitative similarity, they carve at the 
joints, they are intrinsic, they are highly specific, the sets of their instances are 
ipso facto not entirely miscellaneous, there are only just enough of them to 
characterise things completely and without redundancy. 
 Physics has its short list of ‘fundamental physical properties’: the charges 
and masses of particles, also their so-called ‘spins’ and ‘colours’ and ‘flavours’, 
and maybe a few more that have yet to be discovered. […] What physics has 
undertaken […] is an inventory of the sparse properties of this-worldly things. 
 If we have the abundant properties […] then we have one of them for each 
of the sparse properties. So we may as well say that the sparse properties are just 
some—a very small minority—of the abundant properties. We need no other 
entities, just an inegalitarian distinction among the ones we’ve already got. When 
a property belongs to the small minority, I call it a natural property.” (1986, 60 
my emphasis) 
 
The most natural properties are also called the perfectly natural properties. They are in 
the elite or sparse minority of the abundant properties. Lewis suggests that the 
perfectly natural properties of this world are the most fundamental physical properties 
given by present-day physics. For example, the properties of being charge, spin, mass, 
quark flavors, colors, and so on, in this respect, are the perfectly natural properties of 
this world. Since naturalness comes in degrees, the degrees of naturalness decrease 
when the degrees of physical fundamentality decrease. For example, the properties of 
being a proton, an electron, a neutron, and so on, are less natural than the perfectly 
natural properties just mentioned; the properties of air, fire, water, and so on, are even 
lesser; and so forth. 
 Having elucidated the notion of eligibility, let us talk about the measurement of 
eligibility. For an interpretation to be correct, it must maximize the sum of the degree 
of truth and the degree of eligibility. But it is not immediately obvious about what it is 
meant by ‘maximize the degree of eligibility’. The idea of maximization of the degree 
of eligibility can be put more carefully as follows. 
 
(2a) An interpretation I maximizes the degree of eligibility iff I assigns as much 
as possible eligible meanings to predicates. 
 
Lewis suggests that eligibility can be measured by the definability of naturalness. A 
paradigm example: the meaning of being green is more eligible than the meaning of 
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being grue. Following Goodman (1955, ch. 3), being grue is generally defined in terms 
of either being green and being observed before 2100 or being blue and being not so 
observed yet. More carefully, an object is grue iff either it is green and observed before 
2100 or it is blue and not yet observed. Given its conjunctive and disjunctive nature, 
it is plausible to think that ‘being grue’ has a longer chain of the definability in terms 
of naturalness. Other things being equal, it follows that the meaning of being green is 
more eligible than the meaning of being grue to serve as a meaning of the predicate ‘is 
green’.  
 It might be misguided to think that less eligible or ineligible meanings like the 
meaning of being grue are unrelated to the objective nature of the world, and so they 
play no role in meaning-determination. Quite a contrary. Lewis does not intend to say 
that a correct interpretation only maximizes the eligibility of meanings. The main 
thesis of Lewis’s reference magnetism is to maximize the sum of the degree of truth 
and the degree of eligibility. The following is Lewis’s words: 
 
“Ceteris paribus, an eligible interpretation is one that maximises the eligibility of 
referents overall. Yet it may assign some fairly poor referents if there is good 
reason to. After all, ‘grue’ is a word of our language! Ceteris aren't paribus, of 
course; overall eligibility of referents is a matter of degree, making total theory 
come true is a matter of degree, the two desiderata trade off. The correct, 
‘intended’ interpretations are the ones that strike the best balance.” (Lewis 1984, 
228-9) 
 
This quotation is fairly clear except the word “trade off”. I would thereby try to shed 
the light on this notion in what follows. 
 
(3) Maximizing the Sum of the Degree of Truth and the Degree of Eligibility 
As we have seen Lewis’s quotation, the weighting of the degree of truth and the degree 
of eligibility is an important matter. Unfortunately, Lewis did not say much on this in 
his (1984). Here, I will illustrate how a true reference magnetism might maximize the 
sum of the degree of truth and the degree of eligibility:  
 
(3a) An interpretation I maximizes the sum of the degree of truth and the degree 




Let us imagine that there is a scoreboard for the measurement of the degree of truth 
and the degree of eligibility. An interpretation starts from 0 point. Although there are 
infinitely many actual and possible sentences of a language, words of a language are 
presumably finite. An interpretation is said to score maximal points if it assigns 
meanings to every word of a language on the ground of the constraints of fit-with-use 
(1a) and eligibility (2a). This is how it works. The maximization of the degree of truth 
requires that the meaning-assignments under an interpretation fits with the linguistic 
use of a person or a population. Every time when an interpretation assigns a fitting 
meaning to a word that ipso facto reflects the linguistic use of a person or a population, 
then the interpretation scores one point and becomes +1. The maximization of the 
degree of eligibility requires that an interpretation must assign as much as possible 
eligible meanings to predicates. Every time when an interpretation assigns the most 
eligible meaning or the perfectly natural property to a predicate, then the interpretation 
scores one point and becomes +1. When an interpretation assigns two fitting or two 
most eligible meanings to words, it scores two points and becomes +2. And so forth. 
Let us demonstrate this idea by the following figure. 
 
 Fit with use Eligibility  
(I1) 1 1 Every swan is charged. 
(I2) 2 1 Every electron is charged or not a cow. 
(I3) 2 2 Every electron is charged. 
 
Suppose that there is a sentence “Every electron is charged” and call it (E). Suppose 
that there are three interpretations for (E) and each of them has different degrees of 
truth and eligibility. Note that this point-scoring is just an approximation. The idea of 
it is to make the notion of maximization more vivid and measurable. 
 In interpretation 1 (I1), let us assign the meaning of being a swan to the predicate 
‘is an electron’ and being charged to the predicate ‘is charged’. For the degree of truth, 
(E) comes out false under I1, since I1 makes (E) come out false under I1, but nonetheless 
people assert (E). (I will explain more on this in section 3.6.) So I1 assigns an unfitting 
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meaning to ‘is an electron’. But since I1 assigns a fitting meaning to ‘is charged’, it 
scores 1 point and becomes +1. For the degree of eligibility, since ‘being an electron’ 
is more eligible than ‘being a swan’, this meaning-assignment under I1 scores no point. 
But since I1 assigns an eligible meaning to ‘is charged’, it scores 1 point and becomes 
+1. So far, I1 has 1 point for the degree of truth and 1 point for the degree of eligibility. 
In total, I1 scores 2 points. 
 In interpretation 2 (I2), let us assign the meaning of being an electron to the 
predicate ‘is an electron’ and being charged or not a cow to the predicate ‘is charged. 
(E) come out true under I2 since I2 makes (E) come out true under I2 and people assert 
(E). So, I2 is considered as fitting-with-use and it assigns two fitting meanings to ‘is 
an electron’ and ‘is charged’. I2 scores 2 points for the degree of truth. Nonetheless, I2 
does pretty bad for the degree of eligibility. For being charged or not a cow is less 
eligible than being charged to serve as a meaning of the predicate ‘is charged’. It is 
because by the chain of the definability in terms of naturalness, being charged or not 
a cow is longer than being charged. Since I2 does not assign the most eligible meaning 
to ‘is charged’, it scores no point. But since I2 assigns an eligible meaning to ‘is an 
election’, it scores 1 point. So far, I2 has 2 points for the degree of truth and 1 point for 
the degree of eligibility. In total, I2 scores 3 points. 
 In interpretation 3 (I3), let us assign the meaning of being an electron to the 
predicate ‘is an electron’ and being charged to the predicate ‘is charged’. For the degree 
of truth, I3 scores 2 points since it assigns two fitting meanings to ‘is an electron’ and 
‘is charged’. For the degree of eligibility, I3 also scores 2 points since it assigns two 
most eligible meanings to ‘is an electron’ and ‘is charged’. So far, I3 has 2 points for 
the degree of truth and 2 points for the degree of eligibility. In total, I3 scores 4 points. 
Thus understood, I3 scores the maximal of the degree of truth and eligibility. That is to 
say, I3 maximizes the sum of the degree of truth and the degree of eligibility. Therefore, 
I3 is a correct interpretation for (E). 
 It is worth briefly noting that when we make interpretations for a language, say 
English, we do not consider a single sentence but every sentence in English. But, 
though, I admit that it is not clear how the counting method we illustrated will work 






4. Revisiting My Modified Account 
After discussing Lewis’s reference magnetism, we are now in the position to finalize 
my proposed account. In the beginning of section 3.1, I have proposed a modified 
version of Sider’s account of necessity as follows: 
 
(*) A non-modal qualitative sentence S in a language L is a de dicto necessary 
truth iff S is a non-modal qualitative, de dicto and true sentence such that 
 
(1) There is a state of affairs 𝜙 such that i) S in L expresses 𝜙 and ii) for some 
sentence S* in some language of predicate logic L* and for some interpretation 
I*, S* in L* expresses 𝜙 under I*, and 
 
(2) S* in L* is a logical consequence of the set of mathematical truths in L* under 
I* and metaphysical laws in L* under I*. 
 
(i) 
We have already articulated (2) in the beginning of section 3.1. To articulate (1), I have 
sketched my use of the term ‘states of affairs’. A state of affairs is a way things are or 
a way things are not. They are not literally true or false, but obtaining or not obtaining. 
In section 3.2, I have attempted to explain ‘express’ in terms of speakers’ intentions in 
Grice’s theory of meaning. But I gave up this approach since to take it will lead a 
dilemma where I have to either take mental states to be primitive notions or offer a 
reductive explanation for mental states. Either way, it causes problems. In section 3.3, 
I have outlined Lewis’s reference magnetism. Now, we are ready to define ‘express’ 
in i) in terms of the notion of a correct interpretation of reference magnetism as follows. 
 
(3) A sentence S in a language L expresses a state of affairs 𝜙 iff for some 
interpretation I, I is a correct interpretation of L and S in L expresses 𝜙 under I. 
 
The idea of (3) is to define the notion of ‘express’ as the notion of a correct 
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interpretation of reference magnetism. Intuitively, the sentence ‘Every snow is white’ 
expresses the state of affairs that every snow is white. But why not the state of affairs 
that some apples are red, or the state of affairs that some dogs are cute, or some others? 
This remains a mystery unless we are able to explain the ‘expressing’ relation between 
sentences and states of affairs. Thus, reference magnetism comes in. As we have seen 
in section 3.3, reference magnetism is a theory of a correct interpretation. According 
to reference magnetism, to say that an English sentence S expresses a state of affairs 
𝜙 is to say that S expresses 𝜙 under a correct interpretation of English. This accounts 
for the ‘expressing’ relation in question on the basis of a correct interpretation of a 
language. To identify a correct interpretation of a language, we seek to achieve an 
interpretation that maximizes the sum of the degree of truth and the degree of eligibility. 
According to reference magnetism, the definition of a correct interpretation is the 
following: 
 
(RM) An interpretation I is a correct interpretation of a language L as used by a 
person X or a population P iff I maximizes the sum of the degree of truth and the 
degree of eligibility. 
 
I assume that we have enough acquaintance with (RM) since we have fully explained 
each of essential elements of (RM) in the last section. So far, I have finished my 
clarification of i). Next, let us proceed to ii). 
 
(ii) 
Recall my proposed account.  
 
(*) A non-modal qualitative sentence S in a language L is a de dicto necessary 
truth iff S is a non-modal qualitative, de dicto and true sentence such that 
 
(1) There is a state of affairs 𝜙 such that i) S in L expresses 𝜙 and ii) for some 
sentence S* in some language of predicate logic L* and for some interpretation 




(2) S* in L* is a logical consequence of the set of mathematical truths in L* under 
I* and metaphysical laws in L* under I*. 
 
As we can see, there are several significant differences between i) and ii). First, S* is 
stipulated to be stated in some language of predicate logic L*. Presumably, S* will be 
something like ‘Fa Ú ¬Fa’, or ‘"x(Cx→Cx)’. For example, ‘F’ and ‘C’ are predicates 
and ‘a’ is a name, and they all get assigned different meanings under different 
interpretations, while ‘x’ a variable and it gets assigned to different objects under 
different variable-assignment functions. Second, because S* is written in L*, reference 
magnetism plays no role in determining which interpretation is a correct interpretation 
of L*. So, we cannot define the notion of ‘express’ in ii) as the notion of a correct 
interpretation of reference magnetism. It is because there is no correct interpretation 
of L* at all. That is to say, we are free to assign meanings to S* in L*, and any 
interpretation would be equally good. 
 A remark: In section 3.1, we have previously defined mathematical truths in L* 
under I* and metaphysical laws in L* under I*. A mathematical truth 𝜓* in L* under 
I* expresses a mathematical truth 𝜓 in a language L iff i) 𝜓 is a mathematical truth in 
L, and ii) 𝜓* under I* expresses the same state of affairs as 𝜓 in L. Here, let us take L 
to be a language whose vocabularies consist of mathematical, English and set-theoretic 
expressions. A metaphysical law 𝜒* in L* under I* expresses a metaphysical law 𝜒 in 
English iff i) 𝜒 is a metaphysical law in English, and ii) 𝜒* under I* expresses the same 
state of affairs as 𝜒 in English. Of course, we need not repeat again how we have 
defined a mathematical truth 𝜓 in L and a metaphysical law 𝜒 in English. (Readers 
interested in this may refer to section 3.1.) The point is that the notion of ‘expressing’ 
as used to define mathematical truths 𝜓s* in L* under I* and metaphysical laws 𝜒s* 
in L* under I* is exactly the same as the notion of ‘expressing’ in ii). Hence, the 
following explanation is also applicable to them. 
 Here, let us introduce the basic idea to make sense of ii). Suppose that ‘Fa Ú ¬Fa’ 
is a logical truth of predicate logic, and call it S*. Suppose also that there is a sentence 
in English ‘John runs or it is not the case that John runs’, and call it S. Suppose also 
that there is a correct interpretation I of English. Let us assume that J is an 
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interpretation that maps being run onto ‘F’ and maps John onto ‘a’. Given this setting, 
S in English under I expresses the same state of affairs as S* in L* under J. In other 
words, ‘John runs or it is not the case that John runs’ in English under I expresses the 
same state of affairs as ‘Fa Ú ¬Fa’ in L* under J. Here, interpretation J is thus 
understood in the vicinity of what logicians call ‘interpretation function’, even though 
they do not usually assign a sentence to a state of affairs as the way we do in this thesis. 
In general, a model of logic consists of a domain, an interpretation of names and an 
interpretation of predicates. In a model, an interpretation is a function that maps each 
name to its referent ‘I(a)’ and each n-place predicate to n-place relation ‘I(F)’. To 
handle complex problems, logicians sometimes also need a “variable assignment”40 g 
to temporarily assign variables to some objects in a domain, and a “denotation”41 to 
represent the meaning of a term t with respect to a domain and an assignment function. 
At any rate, logicians almost never need to fully describe a model or fully specify the 
mapping of names to objects and n-place predicate to n-place relation. To describe a 
model for a given problem, they only need to specify the domain and then specify the 
meanings of names and predicates that actually appear to the problem. Similarly, we 
will not try to fully specify the mapping under I*. It is because there are infinite many 
ways in which an interpretation I* could be made. For our purposes, let us assume that 
there is one interpretation I*, in which its mapping corresponds the mapping under a 
correct interpretation I of English, and S* in L* under I* to express the same state of 
affairs as S in L under I.  
 To justify the assumption in question, let us go through an intuitively plausible 
example. Suppose that we want to make a claim that ‘Fa Ú ¬Fa’ in L* under an 
interpretation J expresses the same state of affairs as ‘John runs or it is not the case 
that John runs’ in English under a correct interpretation I of English. Probably, this 
claim will still be justified even though we do not specify the meanings of ‘F’ and ‘a’. 
For it is quite obvious that there is an interpretation function that maps ‘a’ to an object 
John and ‘F’ to a property being run, such that ‘Fa Ú ¬Fa’ in L* under an interpretation 
J expresses the same state of affairs as ‘John runs or it is not the case that John runs’ 
                                               
40 g is a variable assignment =df g is a function that assigns each variable to objects in a domain.  
41 [a]D, g is the denotation of a =df For some term a, i) if a is a name or a predicate, then [a]D, g = I(a), 
ii) if a is a variable, then [a]D, g = g(a). 
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in English under I. Of course, the mapping under J is very simple that we can easily 
write it out if we want to. But to handle complex sentences in English—like ‘Every C0 
is a city’, the exact mapping of interpretation functions I* must be made in a more 
sophisticated way that we cannot even write it out. However, there is really no reason 
why we cannot assume that there is an interpretation I* and S* in L* under I* expresses 
the same state of affairs as ‘Every C0 is a city’ in English under a correct interpretation 
I of English. Hence, let us assume that there is I*. We hold this assumption in exactly 
the same way that we hold the assumption that there is an interpretation J and ‘Fa Ú 
¬Fa’ in L* under J expresses the same state of affairs as ‘John runs or it is not the case 
that John runs’ in English under a correct interpretation I of English. So, given this 
reason, I take it to be a justifiable assumption. 
 To explain (1), all we need is i) a sentence S in a language L expresses 𝜙, and ii) 
there is an interpretation I*, whatever it might be, and S* in L* under I* expresses 𝜙. 
We have defined the notion of ‘express’ in i) as the notion of a correct interpretation 
of reference magnetism. So, we have explained i). Next, we have defined the notion 
of ‘express’ in ii) as an interpretation function of a model in the vicinity of the notion 
of logician interpretation function. And if what I have said in the previous paragraph 
provides a conclusive reason to justify the assumption, then we have also explained ii). 
To explain (2), we have defined mathematical truths 𝜓s* in L* under I*, metaphysical 
laws 𝜒s* in L* under I* and the notion of logical consequence. Putting all together, I 
have defended my proposed analysis (*). As we can see, my analysis provides a 
modified reductive account of necessity. On this account, analytic, natural-kind and 
micro-reduction truths are necessary iff they express the same states of affairs as 
logical truths. Since logical truths are necessary truths, and analytic, natural-kind and 
micro-reduction truths are necessary truths as well. 
 Before moving on, I shall mention some reasons why Lewis’s reference 
magnetism is worthy holding. My proposed analysis (3) will be flawed unless 
reference magnetism is a plausible theory of meaning. Firstly, reference magnetism 
can account for the genuine meanings of our words and give rigorous constraints on 
interpretations for languages. It solves the problem of semantic indeterminacy and 
avoids deviant interpretations. This is a remarkable contribution to philosophy of 
language. Secondly, reference magnetism can arguably account for the genuine 
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meanings of the terms whose meanings diverge radically in philosophical disputes, 
like the notion of knowledge and the notion of personal identity. (See Weatherson 2003; 
Sider 2009) The philosophical significance of reference magnetism is far-reaching. 
Thirdly, together with Compositionality Principle, reference magnetism can be 
extended to account for the genuine meanings of sentences. The basic idea of 
Compositionality Principle is that the meaning of a sentence S is determined by the 
meanings of every expression in S plus the syntactic structure of S. Given these 
theoretic merits, there is good reason to think that reference magnetism is a plausible 
theory of meaning. 
 So: given that reference magnetism is worth holding, we are justified in believing 
(3). So far, I have defined ‘express’ in i) as the notion of a correct interpretation. Also, 
I have showed that ‘express’ in ii) is best understood as an interpretation function of a 
model in the vicinity of the notion of logician interpretation function. At the core of 
my proposed account is that no term whatsoever in (1)-(3) is modally defined. 
Therefore, I have defended my proposed account. Next, I will employ it to account for 
the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. 
 
 
5. Analyzing the Necessity of a Micro-reduction Truth 
Let us work on the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. Let ‘C0’ be a complex 
predicate which describes the actual microphysical states of New York City in every 
detail. On any reasonable account, ‘Every C0 is a city’ is a necessary truth. Let ‘micro-
reduction truth’ be a term of such a necessary truth. In what follows, I will clarify how 
my proposed account addresses the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. 
 Suppose that there is a sentence in some language of predicate logic L* 
‘"x(C0x→(C0x Ú C1x Ú… Cnx))’, where ‘C0x’, ‘C1x’, etc., are formulas, and ‘C0’, ‘C1’, 
etc., are complex predicates, and ‘x’ is a variable. This sentence is a logical truth, no 
matter what meanings of ‘C0’, ‘C1’, and so on amount to. Here, we could assume any 
reductive or nonreductive account of the notion of a logical truth, except for the modal 
account according to which a logical truth is a necessary truth. Otherwise, this causes 
circularity. For present purposes, let us assume a model-theoretical account of a logical 
truth according to which a sentence S is a logical truth iff S is true in all models. 
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According to the model-theoretical account, ‘"x(C0x→(C0x Ú C1x Ú… Cnx))’ is true 
in all models, and thus a logical truth. 
 Now, we can employ my proposed analysis to account for the necessity of a 
micro-reduction truth. To improve readability, let us have abbreviations for S and S*. 
 
S =df ‘Every C0 is a city’ 
S* =df ⸢"x(C0x→(C0x Ú C1x Ú… Cnx))⸣ 
 
Suppose that S is written in English and S* is written in some language of predicate 
logic. Here is my proposed account. 
 
(*) A non-modal qualitative sentence S in a language L is a de dicto necessary 
truth iff S is a non-modal qualitative, de dicto and true sentence such that 
 
(1) There is a state of affairs 𝜙 such that i) S in L expresses 𝜙 and ii) for some 
sentence S* in some language of predicate logic L* and for some interpretation 
I*, S* in L* expresses 𝜙 under I*, and 
 
(2) S* in L* is a logical consequence of the set of mathematical truths in L* under 
I* and metaphysical laws in L* under I*. 
 
To define ‘express’ in i), we need (3). 
 
(3) A sentence S in English expresses a state of affairs 𝜙 iff for some interpretation 
I, I is a correct interpretation of English and S in English expresses 𝜙 under I. 
 
To define the notion of a correct interpretation of English, we need (RM). 
 
(RM) An interpretation I is a correct interpretation of English as used by a person 





Since we have already explained (2) before, let us go to (1) directly. Here, I will 
legitimate my analysis (1) by working on two things. i) I will illustrate how to make a 
correct interpretation I of English for S on the basis of reference magnetism. ii) I will 
justify that there is an interpretation I*, and S* in L* expresses 𝜙 under I*. After that, 
I will clarify the assumptions I need in my analysis (*). 
 
A Correct Interpretation of English for S 
To find out a correct interpretation of English for S, I shall illustrate reference 
magnetism by giving examples. Suppose that English has a unique correct 
interpretation. As stated in (RM), a correct interpretation of English is an interpretation 
that maximizes the sum of the degree of truth and the degree of eligibility. However, 
there is no point in assigning meanings to every sentence of English, in order to simply 
show how to work out a correct interpretation of English. For the sake of simplicity, 
let us only illustrate how to assign meanings to a few relevant words on the basis of 
reference magnetism. My intention is merely to show how a true reference magnetism 
might work. It should be also clear that when one interprets a language, one makes 
interpretations for every sentence of a language, rather than making interpretations for 
one single sentence. 
 Now, our objective is to find out a correct interpretation of English for S. To do 
this, we attempt to make interpretations of English. Suppose that in interpretation 1 (I1) 
we assign being a city to the predicate ‘is a city’ and being C0 to ‘is C0’, and so on. As 
we stipulated, ‘C0’ is a complex predicate for being the actual microphysical states of 
New York City. Presumably, ‘C0’ contains many different atomic predicates inside, say 
‘is a proton’, ‘is an electron’, ‘is 3 kilograms’, ‘is unit negatively charged’ and so forth. 
Suppose also that in I1 we assign being a proton to the predicate ‘is a proton’ and being 




Predicate ‘is a city’ → being a city 
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Predicate ‘is C0’ → being C0 
Predicate ‘P1’, ‘P2’, ‘P3’…‘Pn’→ being M1, M2, M3…Mn 
 
Atomic predicate of C0 ‘is a proton’ → being a proton 
Atomic predicate of C0 ‘is an electron’→ being an electron       being C0 
Atomic predicate of C0 ‘p1, p2, p3…pn’ → being m1, m2, m3…mn 
 
 In order to bring out the contrast, let us make another interpretation. Suppose that 
in interpretation 2 (I2) we assign being a book to the predicate ‘is a city’ and being C0 
to ‘is C0’, and so on. Once again, we stipulate that ‘C0’ is a predicate for being the 
actual microphysical states of New York City. Again, there are many different atomic 
predicates inside ‘C0’, say ‘is a proton’, ‘is an electron’ and so on. Suppose also that 
in I2 we assign being a kangaroo to the predicate ‘is a proton’ and being a dolphin to 
‘is an electron’, and so on. Suppose that I1 and I2 are only different in this regard. They 




Predicate ‘is a city’ → being a book 
Predicate ‘is C0’ → being C0 
Predicate ‘P1’, ‘P2’, ‘P3’…‘Pn’→ being M1, M2, M3…Mn 
 
Atomic predicate of C0 ‘is a proton’ → being a kangaroo 
Atomic predicate of C0 ‘is an electron’→ being a dolphin         being C0 
Atomic predicate of C0 ‘p1, p2, p3…pn’ → being m1, m2, m3…mn 
 
 Now, it is time for weighting of the degree of truth and the degree of eligibility. 
In terms of the degree of truth, I1 achieves a higher degree than I2. Suppose that some 
competent speaker of English asserts the sentence ‘Every proton is a subatomic 
particle’, and call it (P). Clearly, (P) is true under I1. Since (P) is true under I1 and 
English speakers assert (P), I1 fits with our use of (P). But I2 does not fit with our use 
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of (P) since it makes (P) come out false and English speakers assert (P).42 (P) is false 
under I2 because when we assign being a kangaroo to the predicate ‘is a proton’, 
nothing is both in the extension of kangaroos and in the extension of subatomic 
particles. For the same reason, I2 also makes other sentences containing ‘city’, ‘proton’, 
‘electron’ come out false. Therefore, I1 achieves a higher degree of truth than I2. In 
terms of the degree of eligibility, I1 still achieves a higher degree than I2. Presumably, 
being a city and being a book are at a more or less similar degree of eligibility. It is 
hard to tell which one is more eligible than the other. However, it is easy to see that 
the meaning of being a proton is more eligible than the meaning of being a kangaroo 
to serve as a meaning of the predicate ‘is a proton’. Likewise, the meaning of being an 
electron is more eligible than the meaning of being a dolphin to serve as a meaning of 
the predicate ‘is an electron’. Given this, I1 achieves a higher degree of eligibility than 
I2.  
 To conclude, I1 is a correct interpretation of English for S on the basis of reference 
magnetism. Given this, S in English under I1 expresses the state of affairs 𝜙. 
 
Interpretation I* for S* 
Moving on to ii). Recall that S* is a logical truth of the form: 
 
⸢"x(C0x→(C0x Ú C1x Ú… Cnx))⸣ 
 
where ‘C0x’, ‘C1x’, etc., are formulas, and ‘C0’, ‘C1’, etc., are complex predicates, and 
‘x’ is a variable. As we stipulated, S* is written in some language of predicate logic L*. 
Again, since S* is written in L*, reference magnetism cannot help here. There is 
basically no correct interpretation of L* for S*.  
 To solve this problem, I have previously suggested that interpretation I* is best 
understood as an interpretation function of a model in the vicinity of the notion of 
logician interpretation function. Since we cannot fully specify the exact mapping of an 
interpretation function I* for S*, let us assume that there is an interpretation I* in which 
                                               
42 Here we judge whether an interpretation fits with use on the basis of (Fitting) and (¬Fitting) to be 
outlined in section 3.6. 
 
71 
its mapping corresponds to the mapping of a correct interpretation I1 of English, and 
S* in L* under I* expresses the same state of affairs as S in English under I1. My 
justification for this assumption is that there is an interpretation I* indeed. (Recall our 
analogy with ‘Fa Ú ¬Fa’.) I admit that the mapping of I* must be highly sophisticated 
and even infinitely long that we cannot ever write it out. But again, I do not see any 
reason why we cannot assume that there is an interpretation I* and S* in L* expresses 
𝜙 under I*. I assume that if we have a computer program to compute it, then we will 
eventually find that there is such an interpretation I*. Here, the idea is analogous with 
the situation where we try to find out a password for a mobile phone. No matter how 
complex the password is going to be, if we have a computer program to run though all 
possibilities, then the program will eventually work it out. For the same reason, we are 
legitimate to assume that there is an interpretation I*.  
 So far, I have validated my analysis (1) by demonstrating two things. i) I have 
illustrated how to make a correct interpretation I of English for S on the basis of 
reference magnetism. ii) I have justified that there is an interpretation I*, and S* in L* 
expresses 𝜙 under I*. Next, let us clarify why my proposed analysis (*) needs to 




In what follows, I will consider an assumption that I need in my proposed account. 
The assumption is a Compositionality Principle. Surely, we interpret the meanings of 
each word of a language in virtue of a correct interpretation of reference magnetism 
and an interpretation function of a model. But such knowledge alone does not suffice 
to tell us anything about the meanings of sentences of a language. We need an extra 
principle to compose the meanings of words into the meanings of sentences. To do this, 
Compositionality Principle comes in. 
 
(CP) For any sentence S in a language L, the meaning of S in L is determined by 
its syntactic structure and the meanings of its constituents. 
 
Given (CP), the meanings of each word of a language via a correct interpretation of 
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reference magnetism or an interpretation function of a model can be extended to 
account for meanings of sentences of a language. As we have seen, I have defined 
‘express’ in i) in terms of the notion of a correct interpretation of reference magnetism 
and ‘express’ in ii) in terms of interpretation function of logic. Given these two things, 
we can in principle know meanings of each word in English and some language of 
predicate logic. Given (CP), it makes them up into meanings of sentences. Thus 
understood, we need three things to work out states of affairs expressed by sentences: 
reference magnetism, an interpretation function, and a Compositionality Principle. 
 To sum up, I have shown how my proposed analysis accounts for the necessity of 
a micro-reduction truth. On my view, ‘Every C0 is a city’ is a necessary truth iff there 
is a state of affairs 𝜙 such that i) there is a correct interpretation I of English and ‘Every 
C0 is a city’ expresses 𝜙 under I and ii) there is an interpretation I* of L*, 
‘"x(C0x→(C0x Ú C1x Ú… Cnx))’ in L* expresses 𝜙 under I*. 
 Before proceeding, it might be a to mention some reasons why my proposed 
account is worthy holding. Compared with Sider’s account of modality, there are a 
number of theoretical merits in favor of my proposed account. First, my proposed 
account gives a non-circular reduction of de dicto necessity and provides a modest 
improvement on the notion of de dicto necessity. Second, in comparison with Sider’s 
account, my proposed account is equally parsimonious in terms of both ontological 
and ideological commitments. So far, there is no additional ontological entity or 
primitive notion added. Hence, if one finds that the metaphysical landscape of Sider’s 
account of modality is attractive, one should find that my proposed account is 
attractive too. Third, I want to argue that my proposed account is simpler than Sider’s 
account. It might be argued that Sider’s analysis of the necessity of a micro-reduction 
truth is obscure and highly sophisticated in terms of its technical details, whereas my 
proposed account is simple and easy to understand. Why are analytic, natural-kind and 
micro-reduction truths necessary truths? My answer: they express the same states of 
affairs as logical truths, and since logical truths are necessary truths, they are necessary 
truths as well. Although I admit that there are some subtle analyses and technical 
idioms inevitably presented in my proposed account (in the light of the demand of 
clarity and precision), it is still much simpler than Sider’s account in general. I believe 
that other things being equal, simplicity is a good candidate of theoretical merits. Last 
 
73 
but not least, the main advantage of my proposed account is that it can avoid the 
multiple realizability problem disclosed for Sider’s account because it does not appeal 
to Sider’s metaphysical semantics to explain the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. 
Thus, there are cogent reasons in favor of my proposed account. 
 
 
Analytic Truths and Natural-kind Truths 
Before finishing this section, it is worth mentioning that my proposed account can also 
give an account of the necessity of an analytic truth and the necessity of a natural-kind 
truth.43 Consider the following sentences. 
 
(I) Every bachelor is an unmarried man. 
(II) "x(Bx→Bx). 
 
(III) Every water molecule is a H2O molecule. 
(IV) "x(Wx→Wx). 
 
Here, we can give a reductive analysis of the necessities of sentences (I) and (III), just 
in the same way that we have done for the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. I 
assume that we all know how it works. To avoid repetitiousness, let us simplify my 
analysis. Here is the basic idea. The sentence (I)/(III) is a necessary truth iff there is a 
state of affairs 𝜙 such that i) there is a correct interpretation I of English and (I)/(III) 
in English expresses 𝜙 under I and ii) for some logical truth (II)/(IV) in some language 
of predicate logic L*, for some interpretation I* of L*, (II)/(IV) in L* expresses 𝜙 
under I*. We probably need not go through again how to make a correct interpretation 
of English on the basis of reference magnetism, and how we are justified to assume 
that there is an interpretation I* and (II)/(IV) in L* expresses 𝜙 under I*. I think that 
                                               
43 The set of natural-kind truths is a subset of necessary a posteriori truths. In Kripke’s (1972) examples, 
necessary a posteriori truths are richer than that. For example, ‘necessarily, Trump is human’ is a 
necessary a posteriori truth. I am afraid that my proposed account cannot explain this kind of de re 
modal truth. Moreover, I am afraid that my account is also silent about ‘Necessarily, Hesperus is 
Phosphorus’. As we have seen in section 3.1, my proposed account is only applicable to non-modal 
qualitative sentences and leaves de re necessity aside. 
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it would be permissible to leave it out. 
 Before we finish this section, let us explore an alternative approach to account for 
the necessity of an analytic truth and the necessity of a natural-kind truth. Here, I just 
describe this approach, but I myself do not advocate it. The alternative approach allows 
us to get rid of the stipulation that S* is written in some language of predicate logic. 
We only need such a stipulation for explaining the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. 
It is precisely because in stating S* we do not want to confine ourselves to the natural 
languages that we had. This accommodates the possibility that the fundamental story 
of the world goes beyond the scope of any natural language. After all, this is the crucial 
point of analyzing the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. But things become easier 
in accounting for the necessity of an analytic truth and the necessity of a natural-kind 
truth. We can simply take both S and S* to be written in English. 
 
(I) Every bachelor is an unmarried man. 
(II') Every bachelor is a bachelor. 
 
(III) Every water molecule is a H2O molecule. 
(IV') Every water molecule is a water molecule. 
 
Let us take (I) as our working example. If (I) works, there is no reason why others do 
not. To account for the necessity of (I), one can simply argue that (I) expresses the 
same state of affairs as (II') under a correct interpretation of English. They express the 
same state of affairs since the predicate ‘is a bachelor’ expresses the same property as 
the predicate ‘is an unmarried man’ under a correct interpretation of English. Of course, 
we also need a Compositionality Principle to compose meanings of words into 
meanings of sentences. Finally, we might need to hold a structured theory of states of 
affairs to identify the sameness of (I) and (II'). Roughly speaking, according to some 
general version of structured theories of states of affairs, two states of affairs are 
identical iff they have the same structure and constituents in the same order. Let us 
assume for the sake of argument that states of affairs have objects and properties as 
constituents, and the ordered n-tuples represent the (alleged) structure of states of 
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affairs. Consider the following sentences.44 
 
(1) The state of affairs that Marilyn Monroe is an actress. 
 
(1*) <a, being F> 
 
(2) The state of affairs that Norma Jean Baker is an actress. 
 
(2*) <a, being F> 
 
In (1*) and (2*), ‘a’ is the referent of both Marilyn Monroe and Norma Jean Baker, 
and ‘F’ is the property of being an actress. According to the toy account of structured 
states of affairs we assume here, the states of affairs (1) and (2) are identical since they 
contain the same object and property as constituents in the same order. For the names 
‘Marilyn Monroe’ and ‘Norma Jean Baker’ refer to the very same object. On this view, 
the states of affairs (1) and (2) are the same state of affairs under different names. 
 Likewise, the states of affairs (3) and (4) are identical since they contain the same 
property as constituents in the same order. 
 
(3) The state of affairs that every bachelor is an unmarried man. 
 
(3*) <"x <<x, being F>→<x, being F>>> 
 
(4) The state of affairs that every bachelor is a bachelor. 
 
(4*) <"x <<x, being F>→<x, being F>>> 
 
In (3*) and (4*), ‘F’ is the property of being a bachelor. As we can see, (3) and (4) 
identical because the predicates ‘is a bachelor’ and ‘is an unmarried man’ actually 
express the same property. This claim can be justified by reference magnetism. 
                                               
44 This example is adopted from the entry “State of Affairs” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
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Therefore, the states of affairs (3) and (4) are the same state of affairs under different 
predicates. 
 So: it proves that (I) expresses the same state of affairs as (II'). Again, to describe 
this approach is just for bringing out an alternative option to account for the necessity 
of an analytic truth and the necessity of a natural-kind truth. It is important to note that 
the alternative approach does not work for the necessity of a micro-reduction truth, 
since we do not want S* to be written in English or any natural language. For there is 
no guarantee that natural languages that we had can cover the fundamental story of the 
world. I myself stand for my proposed account. i) For it is more flexible and general 
to account for the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. ii) And it requires no additional 
assumption for states of affairs to be structured and have constituents (since it is highly 
disputable), but still reach to the same conclusion. 
 
 
6. An Objection to My Modified Account 
It is argued that Lewis’s reference magnetism is vague in terms of the notion of ‘fit-
with-use’. Previously, we said that an interpretation I maximizes the degree of truth iff 
the meaning-assignments under I fits with the linguistic use of a person X or a 
population P. But how exactly can we determine whether or not an interpretation fits 
with the linguistic behaviors of a person or a population? I admit that this objection is 
plausibly correct. The notion of fit-with-use is vague because so far we do not have a 
precise condition under which we can judge whether or not an interpretation fits with 
use. On this basis, I would like, in an exploratory spirit, to sketch a minor modification 
by specifying the conditions of fitting and non-fitting. 
 
Revising the Notion of Fit-with-use 
Suppose that we are going to identify a correct interpretation of English on the basis 
of reference magnetism. Suppose also that there is a correct interpretation I of English. 
To recapitulate the notion of a correct interpretation, 
 
(RM) An interpretation I is a correct interpretation of English as used by a person 





To maximize the degree of truth, Lewis contends that a correct interpretation must 
assign meanings to words on the basis of the linguistic behaviors of a person X or a 
population P. This suggests the following: 
 
(1a) An interpretation I maximizes the degree of truth iff I fits with the linguistic 
use of a person X or a population P. 
 
Here, we go to the degree of truth. Since we only want to show how to measure the 
degree of truth, let us pass over the part of eligibility for the sake of convenience. It 
may be helpful to have a working example. To simplify, let us suppose that there are 
only three sentences in our simplified English. 
 
(1) Every swan is a bird. 
 
(2) Socrates is a kangaroo. 
 
(3) Plato has two legs, two hands, one nose, and is an ancient Greek. 
 
Now, we are going to judge whether the interpretation I fits with the linguistic 
behaviors of a person’s use of or a population’s use of (1), (2) and (3). In principle, an 
interpretation can presumably manage the use of a population. This just involves more 
information and gets more complicated. For simplicity, let us stick to the use of a 
person. To make such a judgment, we need to have a precise condition under which an 
interpretation is considered as fitting with the use of a person. Here is a suggestion.45 
 
(Fitting) An interpretation I fits with a person X’s use of a sentence S iff either  
 
(i) S is true under I and X asserts S, 
                                               




(ii) S is false under I and X never asserts S, or 
 
(iii) S is true under I and X never asserts S. 
 
To judge whether or not the interpretation I fits with a person’s use of a sentence, we 
need a truth theory to determine the truth-conditions of sentences. Let us assume that 
there is a true truth theory and it generates T-theorems to determine the truth-conditions 
of sentences. Let us also assume that, given facts of the world, an interpretation of a 
language L can determine the truth-conditions for all sentences in L by the true truth 
theory we assume. Therefore, we shall assume that the followings are true: 
 
T-theorem: S is true iff P. 
 
(D) Given facts of the world, an interpretation of a language L can determine the 
truth-conditions for all sentences in L. 
 
Suppose that the person in question is a competent speaker of English, Mary. Suppose 
that Mary asserts (1), and for (1) we assign being a swan to ‘is a swan’ and being a 
bird to ‘is a bird’ under I. Given condition (i), (1) is true under I and Mary asserts (1). 
Hence, we say that I fits with Mary’s use of (1). 
 
T-theorem 1: ‘Every swan is a bird’ is true iff every swan is a bird. 
 
Suppose that Mary never asserts (2) and for (2) we assign being Socrates to ‘Socrates’ 
and being a kangaroo to ‘is a kangaroo’ under I. Given condition (ii), (2) is false under 
I and she never asserts (2). Given the world, Socrates is not a kangaroo. Hence, we say 
that I fits with her use of (2). 
 
T-theorem 2: ‘Socrates is a kangaroo’ is true iff Socrates is a kangaroo. 
 
Suppose that Mary never asserts (3) and for (3) we assign the object Plato to ‘Plato’, 
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being a leg to ‘is a leg’, being a hand to ‘is a hand’, being a nose to ‘is a nose’, being 
an ancient to ‘is an ancient’ and being a Greek to ‘is a Greek’ under I. Given condition 
(iii), (3) is true under I and she never asserts (3). Hence, we say that I fits with her use 
of (3). 
 
T-theorem 3: ‘Plato has two legs, two hands, one nose, and is an ancient Greek’ 
is true iff Plato has two legs, two hands, one nose, and is an ancient Greek. 
 
The general idea of Fitting is simple. It contains two parts. The first part is that we 
employ a true truth theory to determine the truth-conditions of sentences and we 
assume that given facts of the world, an interpretation of a language L can determine 
the truth-conditions for all sentences in L by the true truth theory we employ. Therefore, 
we are in the position to know whether a sentence under an interpretation is true or 
false. The second part deals with facts about whether or not a person asserts a sentence. 
Let us assume that we can know these facts by observation. (Let us ignore 
Epistemology for a moment.) Here, we assume that a person’s asserting or not 
asserting a sentence counts as a part of the person’s linguistic behaviors.  
 Next, let us describe the notion of ¬Fitting. Imagine that there is an interpretation 
J where we assign being an egg to the predicate ‘is a bird’. Obviously, interpretation J 
makes (1) come out false, but suppose that Mary asserts (1) nevertheless. Hence, we 
say that (1) is false under J and she asserts it. How would my proposed modification 
account for such an unusual phenomenon? Well, we count it as non-fitting. We say that 
interpretation J fails to fit with her use of (1). Here, let us propose (¬Fitting): 
 
(¬Fitting) An interpretation I fails to fit with a person X’s use of a sentence S iff 
(i) S is false under I and X asserts S.  
 
Imagine an extraordinary situation where Mary always asserts false sentences like (2) 
‘Socrates is a kangaroo’, and (2) is clearly false under I. For these phenomena, we can 
think of Mary’s abnormal use of language as a disobedience to the rule of use. A 
language under an interpretation provides certain rules of use, and they are not only 
syntactic rules but also perhaps conventional or behavioral rules. As a language user, 
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Mary can choose to obey or disobey the rules of use. When she asserts (2) and (2) is 
clearly false under I, it seems to suggest that she disobeys the rule of use of (2) under 
I. Thus understood, it would be permissible to rephrase (¬Fitting) into (¬Obeying): 
 
(¬Obeying) An interpretation I fails to fit with a person X’s use of a sentence S iff 
S is false under I and a person X disobeys the rule of use of S. 
 
Although (¬Fitting) and (¬Obeying) use different descriptions to specify the condition 
of non-fitting, they actually talk about the same thing.  
 This is a final remark. Lewis’s notion of fit-with-use is best thought of as a matter 
of degrees. Thus, we want (Fitting) to accommodate this too. Here, we suggest (D-
fitting): 
 
(D-Fitting) An interpretation I maximizes the degree of fitting with the linguistic 
use of a person X or a population P iff I scores the maximal point of (¬Fitting) or 
as high as possible. 
 
We assume that an interpretation starts from 0 point of (¬Fitting). Since there are 
infinitely many actual and possible sentences of a language that count as (Fitting), it 
would be unwise to calculate it by addition. The point will definitely be infinite. 
Instead, we suggest using deduction. Every time when an interpretation counts as 
(¬Fitting), it loses one point and becomes -1. To put it in terms of (¬Obeying), every 
time when a person or a population disobeys the rule of use of a sentence, it loses one 
point and becomes -1. It goes without say that if an interpretation counts as (¬Fitting) 
or (¬Obeying) twice, it loses two points and becomes -2. And so forth. That is to say, 
the maximal or ideal degree of fitting-with-use is 0 point. This means that an 
interpretation has no (¬Fitting) or (¬Obeying) whatsoever. It is ideally and perfectly 
fitting. However, when we interpret multitudinous sentences of a language, it is rare 
to have the perfectly fitting. To compare two or more interpretations, a winning 
interpretation is an interpretation with the highest point. 
 Although this modified version of the notion of fit-with-use is not a fully 
developed version, this modification has specified the conditions under which an 
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interpretation is considered as fitting or non-fitting with the use of a person. And we 








This thesis explores the metaphysical nature of necessity. In chapter 1, I have discussed 
Theodore Sider’s (2011) new reductive account of metaphysical necessity and in 
particular focused on his analysis of the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. In chapter 
2, I have presented and clarified the multiple realizability problem posed by Jonathan 
Schaffer (2013). In brief, he shows that Sider’s metaphysical semantics cannot handle 
multiple realizability. His critique offers conclusive reason to think that there must be 
something wrong with Sider’s metaphysical semantics. Since Sider’s analysis of the 
necessity of a micro-reduction truth is mostly constitutive of his metaphysical 
semantics, something has gone wrong in either one (or both) if Schaffer’s critique is 
successful. At any rate, it motivates a modified version of Sider’s account of necessity. 
 The most important result of this thesis is presented in chapter 3. Given the 
multiple realizability problem, I have shown that the necessity of a micro-reduction 
truth can be reductively defined without appeal to Sider’s metaphysical semantics. I 
have propounded and defended a modified version of Sider’s account of necessity. On 
my account, analytic, natural-kind and micro-reduction truths are necessary if and only 
if they express the same states of affairs as logical truths. Since logical truths are 
necessary truths, analytic, natural-kind and micro-reduction truths are necessary truths 
as well. I have accounted for the necessity of a micro-reduction truth as follows. 
Suppose that the English sentence ‘Every C0 is a city’ is a necessary truth. To address 
such a necessity, I have argued that ‘Every C0 is a city’ is a necessary truth if and only 
if 
 
There is a state of affairs 𝜙 such that i) ‘Every C0 is a city’ in English expresses 
𝜙 and ii) there is an interpretation I* of L* and ‘"x(C0x→(C0x Ú C1x Ú… Cnx))’ 
in L* expresses 𝜙 under I*. 
 
To legitimate my proposed analysis, I have defended two central claims in section 3.5. 
(1) I have defined ‘express’ in i) in terms of the notion of a correct interpretation of 
Lewis’s reference magnetism and have shown how to make a correct interpretation I 
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of English for ‘Every C0 is a city’ on the basis of reference magnetism. (2) I have 
argued that it is reasonable to assume that there is an interpretation I* in some predicate 
logic L*, in which its mapping corresponds to the mapping of a correct interpretation 
I of English, and ‘"x(C0x→(C0x Ú C1x Ú… Cnx))’ in L* expresses 𝜙 under I*.  
 I hope that I have successfully defended my claims (1) and (2). I also hope that 
my proposed analysis has provided a sufficiently clear and plausible explanation for 
the necessity of a micro-reduction truth, the necessity of an analytic truth and the 
necessity of a natural-kind truth. 
 
II. 
Let me finish this thesis by propounding some open problems that I have not fully 
explored here and I want to study in future work.  
 In this thesis, I leave aside an open problem of how two states of affairs are 
identical to each other. What is the individuation-condition of a state of affairs? As 
Mark Textor (2016, section 6) puts it, “a theory of states of affairs must answer the 
question how a state of affairs can “involve” objects and properties (relations) and 
combine them, if the objects don’t exemplify the properties (stand in the relations)”. 
For example, if one believes that states of affairs have a certain structure, then it is 
philosophically important to have an in-depth study of how a state of affairs is 
structured and its constituents bind together. In this thesis, I cannot spare myself 
dealing with this question. 
 Another question concerns a reductive analysis of de re necessity. It is superfluous 
for me to say that my modified account is an account of de dicto necessity and applies 
only to non-modal qualitative sentences. A completed account of necessity should be 
able to account for both de dicto and de re modality. To give an account of all modal 
sentences, I might base my modified account on Lewis’s counterpart theory and define 
abstract possible worlds and individuals non-modally. I hope to study this project in 
the near future. 
 Finally, I am curious about whether my modified account can be somehow taken 
to be an account of the connection between the fundamental and the non-fundamental. 
I am optimistic about that. The very rough idea I can give is the following: to say that 
a non-fundamental sentence SN holds in virtue of a fundamental sentence SF is to say 
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that SN expresses the same state of affairs as SF. More carefully,  
 
(#) A non-fundamental sentence SN holds in virtue of a fundamental sentence SF 
iff there is a state of affairs 𝜙 such that i) SN in non-fundamental language 
expresses 𝜙 and ii) there is an interpretation I* of L* and SF in L* expresses 𝜙 
under I*. 
 
Suppose that we have a language of predicate logic L* and an interpretation I* that 
maps each predicate to a perfectly natural property or relation; and L* contains enough 
predicates and names such that: for each object O, I* maps a name in L* to O, and for 
each property or relation P, I* maps a predicate in L* to P. If so, then we have a 
powerful language as acting like Sider’s fundamental language. Given this language, 
we can in principle tell the non-fundamental story of the world by using only 
fundamental language. 
 An apparent problem is that my sketchy analysis will also face the multiple 
realizability problem posed Schaffer. This is how it can address the problem. For 
example, I can say that (1) the sentence ‘Moore has hands’ expresses the same state of 
affairs as the sentence ‘M instantiates H’, where M is the actual microstate identified 
with Moore in L* and H is the property of having hands in L*. Frist, I assume that the 
notion of instantiation is a fundamental notion. This differs from Sider’s metaphysical 
semantics. Second, the expressing relation is the biconditional: ‘Moore has hands’ ↔ 
‘M instantiates H’. Third, my primary concern is how to specify H. Schaffer has 
proposed the triple conditions of adequacy for Sider’s metaphysical semantics. Is my 
sketchy analysis able to meet the triple conditions of adequacy? I am optimistic about 
this but there must be some revisions, though I will not here attempt these revisions. I 
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